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1 The Development of the Office of Prime Minister during
I
the Eighteenth century.
I The Cabinet, which is the distinguishing feature of
the English Constitution, the link which connects the legislative
and executive departments of government, producing a harmony and
''symmetry of governmental action not to be found elsewhere, is
|Still unkno7/n to English law. Today the keystone of the Cabinet
-arch is the Prime Minister, and although all members of the Cabi
'net are on an equal footing, yet he, as the head of the Cabinet,
lOCCUpies a position which so long as it lasts, is one of excep-
usually
tional power and authority. His official position is/that of
iFirst Lord of the Treasury; as Prime Minister he has no more
jlegal status than the cabinet. The office seems to be peculiar-
ly English in that it has evolved, like most of their political
'institutions, by the process of trial and error. It is our aim
!to trace this evolution during the eighteenth century, which saw
ithe birth of the office, its narrow escape from extinction, and
^toward the end of the century its definite establishment*
' It seems -vise to explain in a general way the ground
to be covered. There are many phases of this subject to be con-
isidered, of which the following are the most important; the Prime
li/Iinister ' 3 relation to the King, his relation to the House of
iCommons, his dependence upon party, and his degree of authority
\in the Cabinet, We may simplify the whole problem by dividing
the century into three periods; the first from 1700 to 1770, the
second from 1770 to 1783, and the last from 1783 to 1803.
iI
During the first of these periods there seems to have been ^
more or less definite progress in the crystallization of the
functions and powers which are the common property of the
modern Prime Minister. Prom 1770 to 1783, when George III
was at the height of his power, this process was m ore or Icoo '
interrupted. Finally, from 1783 to the end of the century,
we will atter.pt to show the rees tablishment which took place
of the customs upon which the office resbs.

zA. The Period from 1700 to 1770
I Cabinet Development in General before 1721
Although 3ir Robert '.Talpdle is generally considered
to have been the first Prime Llinister, it will be advantageous
to review briefly the Cabinet system as it functioned between
1700 and 1721. In the reign of ^ueen Anne the Cabinet may be
taken to mean the group of Privy Councillors with whom the
Queen consulted on affairs of State. iShe saw clearly that
party governmeht meant the surrender of the Hoyal personality,
and with this in mind ^he appointed her first ministry with the
express purpose of having a certain difference of opinion among
her Ministers; thus, her Cabinets were not divided by accident,
but b^." principle, xhis is the reason that she refused in 1706
to appoint a united Whig Ministry at the suggestion of Godol-
1
phin. But even now, the feeling was developing that if the
first Minister were not to appoint his colleagues, he was at
le^st to be consulted in their appointment. Nevertheless, in
this matter Godolphin yielded absolutely to the Queen. Even at
that time he was much blamed for submitting to such indignity.
So we see that the office of Prime Minister had already begun
to emerge, at least in the eyes of a few.
By the death of <iueen Anne, then (1714), a Cabinet was
in existence, though not explicitly defined ^or generally accept-
ed. The choice of the Crown as to its confidential servants was
but vaguely limited, and the iiovereign still governed through
the Ministers, rather than the Ministers through the Grown.
? H^y ;iPi^riing ? 1 i n i . ^^^^^^^^^^^

There was as yet, of course, no idea of party government as it
is now carried on, and coalition Cabinets were normal rather
1
than abnormal. Ministerial responsibility within the Cabinet
was unknown. The Ministerial responsibility which binds the
modern Cabinet requires that all members of the Cabinet be of
the same opinion on matters of governmental policy; in other
words, all the Ministers of the present day Cabinet present a
united front on political measures, at least in public. If a
Minister does not approve the policy of the Prime Minister and
the remainder of the Cabinet, his only alternative is to resign
his post. Likewise, the responsibility of the Cabinet to Parlifi
ment was not yet understood. By this is meant simply the un-
written law by which the Cabinet goes out of power when a mea-
sure proposed by it is defeated in the House of Commons. This
Cabinet responsibility to Parliament did not come in for ano-
ther generation.
II. Office of Prime Llinister Arises because of Necessity.
The office of Prime Llinister evolved naturally, as
did the power of the Cabinet; that is, there was no definite
recognition of it, even in the minds of the most far-sighted
statesmen who themselves were unconsciously establishing the
office. The coming of the House of Hanover to the English
throne made certain that this peculiar progress would go on.
1 By a Coalition Cabinet is meant a Cabinet containing
Ministers from more than one party.

George I was a German, and had no desire to adapt himself to
his nev/ Kingdom, The Constitutional development then destroy-
ing Royal prerogative caused him no great concern. Further,
George I knew no English. This fact is important, because the
difficulties which the first of the Hanoverians had in under-
standing English ways and methods, and his lack of interest
in learning the ins and outs of the English Constitution needed
only this added difficulty of talking things over freely with
his Ministers to make him quite willing to turn over to them
the ordinary running of the Government without interference,
and even the determination of policy in many cases where German
politics were not dirs:>t\y concerned, George II was not much
more occupied with English political questions than was George I,
This inability of the two foreign Kings to govern necessitated
a rapid development in the office of Prime Minister that busines
might be transacted to advantage either in Cabinet or Parliament
One very definite way in which these German Kings as-
sisted in th4 development of the Prime Minister's office was
in their failure to preside over the meetings of the Cabinet.
For sane time after the Cabinet had been accepted as a part of
the Government^ the Sovereign was its only superior. Indeed^
Queen Anne held a Cabinet every Sunday at which she herself was
present. In 1714, however, probably due more than anything else
to the fact that he did not understand the language in which
its deliberations were carried on, George I stopped attending
the Cabinet meetings, and generally relinquished his place in
actual government. So, as a leader was needed, a sort of

presidency in the cabinet developed in one of its own members;
in other words, a mere chairmanship eventually developed into
a Prime Ministership.
Another factor in the development of the power of the '
Cabinet, and incidentally of its leader, was the long period
of .Vhig supremacy. For fifty years there was an almost exclu-
sive employment of the V/hig party in the important offices of
State. George I was blamed for initiating this state of affairs,
He could not have done otherwise, however, as he had come in as
a prote'g^ of the .Vhigs and any introduction of i'ories into his
Cabinet would have been unsafe. Had the Tories been in power,
the prerogative of the Crown might have been maintained for
some ti:::e, but the ?/higs were those whose fundamental principle
it was to maintain a steady opposition to what they considered
an abuse of the Royal Power. They came to believe that almost
any direct use of this power was an abuse, and that only as it
jl was delegated to responsible Ministers could it be advantageous
to the State. This continual suppression of Royal authority
very materially aided the development of Government by Cabinet
and Parliament.
Ill Walpole the First Prime Minister
There has not been much dispute about the fact that
Sir Robert V/alpole was the first Prime Linister. It is true
that the Tory, Robert narley, was repeatedly described by Swift
as First Minister, and that Swift even used the term Prime
Minister ; still Harley possessed none of the authority that we
. ,gfliierally_ c on cede to the office, and the Q.tteen was not lare^pared _

7I
to admit that any one ruled but herself. After her death, while
the King was on the continent, I'ownshend was appointed Secre-
tary of Sstate with the power of choosing his own colleagues, hut
^as his abilities were rather mediocre he was not capable of fin-
ding the office of Prime Minister. Upon the dismissal of Town-
I
shend and the resignation of V/alpole, Stanhope and Sunderland
Iwere left to divide the power between them, but as neither party
would allow any special superiority to the other, neither man
oould really be considered a First Minister.
Something should be said concerning V/alpole 's career
in the Cabinet before 1721, V/hen in 1717 he could not agree
I
with his colleagues as to the advisability of granting the
King a supply against Sweden, he resigned from the Cabinet.
The King was so opposed to his resignation that he handed him
1
back his Seals no less than ten times. George was loath to
let him go because of h'.s influence in the House of Commons,
which body was ever becoming a more potent factor in the Govern-
ment, but eventually yielded and accepted his resignation. This
act of ..alpole'fc is significant, because behind it lay the prin-
ciple which he was later to enforce as Prime Minister; namely,
that ministerial responsibility implied ministerial unity in
the Cabinet on vital public questions of the day. V/alpole 's
avowed reason for resigning was that it was impossible for him
ii
;to continue to endorse measures of which he disapproved, which
were introduced by Cabinet rivals. So, in spite of the dissen-
sion from time to time, there was a growing feeling that th-^re
1 Blauveult, .jevelopment of Cabinet Government in i^ngland
.f> . 235.
Referred to hereafter as blauveult.
••
•
ought to be unanimity in the Cabinet. Ihat this feeling had
not matured into an established custom, ho^'ever, was shovcn by
Walpole himself a little later. In 1719 the Stanhope-Sunderland
Administration brought in a bill which was to linit the creatioc^
of peers by the Crown, Though it was defeated in the House of
Commons chiefly by V/alpole's efforts, this did not prevent him
from joining the Government soon afterward, even though he had
not changed his views in the slightest, Furthermore, although
he opposed the South Sea Scheme, he remained a member of the
Cabinet which supported it.
Sir Robert ./alpole is generally considered the first
person who discharged the functions of Prime Minister in the mo-
1
dern sense. de was apioioted j'irst Lord of the treasury and
Chancellor of the 5ixchequer by George 1 in 1721. Though V/alpole
held both of these offices this was not universally true of the
Prime Minister of the eighteenth century. The Duke of Devon-
shire in 1756, chiefly by his rarik in the peerage, and second-
arily as ij'irst Lord in the Treasury, enjoyed a certain official
primacy, but outside Court circles the recognized head of the
Grovernment was Pitt, From 1757 to 1761 everyone knows that Pitt
wielded the power and was the real Prime Llinister, even though
the Duke of Newcastle was at the head of the Treasury, and Pitt
himself was only a i^ecretary of State. In 1761, after Pitt re-
signed, a curious situation existed. Jewcastle still was First
Lord of the Treasury, Grenville was the leader of the House of
Qgg. -c^Qglish Government and Politics , p. 132.
Hereafter referred to as Ogg.

Commons, while Bute vvas really Prime kinister. V/e cannot con-
ceive of a situation more at variance with present customs. Lord
Grenville became head of the Government in 176S holding both the
office of a:'irst Lord of the Treasury and that of Ohancellor of
la
the Exchequer. The two offices had not been united since the
death of aenry lelham. .^'either of these offices, of course, in-
volved any responsibility at that time. They simply provided
the Prime Minister with a salary and v. ith an office which is re-
cognized in the English Constitution. '.Villiam Pitt, who had now
"become the iiarl of Chatham, was again declared Prim.e Minister in
1766, but took the unimportant office of Privy Seal. So we see
that it took a considerable length of time before the custom be-
came firmly established that the Prime Minister should be the
?irst Lord of the treasury and the Chancellor of the .ilxchequer.
ly Relations of the King to Prime Linister
•Valpole had a profound effect upon the office of Prime
Minister. i3ut before we go into his actual administration, it
should be firmly impressed upon the reader's mind that his shap-
ing of -he office wat in no way rremeditated . it was a complete'
ly natural process and the evolution was entirely shaped by the
circumstances of the period.
The Zing's relation to the Prime Minister, and his ef-
feot upon the office throughout the eighteenth century, is of
the utmost importance. This is perhaps more true between 1721
1 The modern Prime Minister is head of the House of Commons in
that he is supposed to be able to command a majority there at
any time or he is dutybound to resign his post.
la That is, held under a single man.

and 1742 than in any other period. Today the immediate source
of a ilinister'e strength is the House of Commons, but in the
first half of the eighteenth century it was the favor of the
court, xhus it was that although V/alpole did more than anyone
else to transfer the power of Government from the King to the
people, yet it was the 2ing who put him at the head of affairs.
George 1, to be sure, was at the mercy of the V/hig clans - ithe
Pelhams, the Cavendishes, and the Cobhams - but among their re-
presentatives he was often able to exercise a limited choice for
first place, ae could choose whether the head of the Administra
tion should be Sunderland, Townshend, or './alpole . In 17£1 he
chose the last named.
The first two Georges, as we pointed out earlier in the
essay, were decidedly weak sovereigns. ./alpole was the first
English statesman to take complete advantage of their weakness,
George 1 he succeeded in rendering entirely subservient to him.
Walpole differed from his predecessors, not in courting royal
favor les£, but in coirting it differently; that is, he made the
King employ him by showing that he, and he alone, was able to
manage the House of Commons. George 1 could not do without mone^
and admitted himself that w'alpole was the only man who could prof
duce a supply of it at will. iSo we see that although ;/alpole de
oted ost of his energy to securing a Parliamentary majority,
he did so that he might thereby control the King. George was in-
deed made to give up many of his pet schemes, but he was also
made to see that his choice was between half a loaf and none at
Iall.

i — =======================================================
I
With Walpole at tlie head of the Government it was workable;
t some of the things which the King wanted could be done. With-
out him was anarchy in the House of Commons and rebellion in
the nation,
' George I did not permit the Whigs to choose his first
I
Cabinet, and he allowed the three great leaders only very
• subordinate positions. As Secretary of State and First
j Alinister he chose Lord Townshend, ;;ho, as we have said, was a
man of only fair abilities, George also changed the Cabinet
I as he saw fit in 1716 and 1717. Stanhope, however, early raiseci
I
the question in letters to Walpole, as to whether the King
i
should exercise unfettered choice in the distribution of offic^,
Is he to coi rnand the services of individual leaders at his own
' discretion^ and to assign them their respective offices as to
i
i him may seem good? ^ueen Anne undoubtedly acted on this princi-
,
pie . But by 1721 Walple thought the time had cone for the
'Ministers to settle the oiiices among them.selves. There were
' two circumstances essential to the growth of the British type
of Goveriaent; one was the exclusion of the King from the Cabi-
net, which we have already remarked upon. The other was the
presence of the Ministers in the Legislature, we have seen
that the King was dependent upon Walpole, and that Walpole 's
pov/er rested upon the House of Commons, His Cabinet, there-
fore, could only be powerful if its members represented the
House of Commons. So it is especially to Walpole that we owe
it that government in England is carried on by Parliamentary
Ministers
•
It
12
Upon the death of George I in 1727 his only son,
George II, cane to the throne. The new 2:ing was under the mis-
taken impression that he could appoint his own Ministers as his
father had done, and as he had been at enmity with v'/alpole for
some years, he undertook to make his friend, Sir Spencer Corap-
ton, his Chief Minister, This choice wat impossible, however,
as there was still only one ^.an in the nation who could control
the House of Commons, and therefore there was only one man fit
to be First Minister. The King, as a result, was immediately
obliged to reinstate V/alpole, as well as hie subordinates.
"Among these was the man whom he had characterized as 'an im-
pertinent fool' (Newcastle), the man who was a 'choleric block-
head' (Townshend), and the man who was a 'scoundrel, fool, and
_1
dirtj buffoon' (Horace V/alpole)." Thus we see that the author-
j ity of the Crown was on the wane.
L^otwit'-Standing his power in Tarliament, Valpole was
too wise to place his support upon it alone apart from Royal
favor. A Prime i-iinister's ability to retain a Parliamentary
majority at that time depended largely on the popular impression
that he had the support of the Grown, liven with the existing
bribery, other things being anywhere near ee[ual, the disposition
of the country was to retain a House of Commons pleasing to the
Xing, and likewise the disposition of Parliament was to main-
tain a Minister pleasing to the King. So .Valpole exerted himself
to the utmost to gain the H^yal favour. As was the case in the
1 Blauveult, p. 156.
•I
I
I
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previous reign, the Civil list would have to be voted and it
was imperative that the King's business should he in the hands
1
of a Linister capable of managing the House of Commons. An
e:^ample of this occurred when Jalpole sought to be reappointed
over G^mpton in 1727. V/hen Conpton suggested a jointure of
j
f 50,000 a year for the l^ueen, V/alpole undertook to double it,
and the King's hesitation in the choice of a leader was brought
to an end. So «Valpole enjoyed the favour of the Court because
he was able by prudent and skillful management of the House of
Commons to obtain its supplies.
Walpole had another source of power with the Court;
George 11, though he did not know it, was rather easily managed
by his ^ueen, Caroline, and by the time he acceded to the throne
in 1727, she had acquired a complete ascendance over him. Al-
though there had been family trouble between the Prince of Wales
and his father, C-eorge I, before 1727, V/alpole, with a thought
for the future, had not neglected to cultivate Caroline's friend-
ship. By the time her husband came to the throne, V/alpole had
impressed the vigorous understanding of 0„ueen Caroline with a
sense of hie value to the Hanoverian dynasty. She clearly saw
that through his control of the Commons was the easiest way
opened of getting things done, ^he also saw that peace and low
taxes, both of which were strongly advocated by V;alpole, were
best for her husband, and she governed hi-n accordingly.
1 LeadKam, Political History of England , Vol. IX, p. 334.
Referred to hereafter as LeadhamT
11
i
1
Morley goes so far as to say that "every design, project, and
combination which he (George II) found in his mind, had been
laboriously planted there by concert between V/alpole and the
Queen. So we may conclude that Caroline was no mean asset to
Walpole. '7ith this friendship in mind, and its value to \/alpold
it is not difficult to see that Caroline's death in 1737 weaken-
ed his power immeasurably. ">7alpole was now left standing abso-
lutely alone, confronted by the fury of the opposition, the
selfishness of his colleagues, and the sudden humors of the King.
John Carteret, jingland's leading representative in
foreign affairs, assume^ an important place in the Cabinet upon
the resignation of V/alpole in 1742, and is now generally acknow-
ledged to have been the Prime Minister from 1742 to 1744. This
was a natural state of affairs, because most of the interest of
the country at that time centred upon foreign relations. Car-
teret thought himself the ablest man in the Cabinet, and tried
to carry all with a high hand; that is, without the Parliamentary
leadership which V/'alpole , as we shall presently see, had recog-
nized as the onl; justification ^or Cabinet leadership, he at-
tempted to fill an even more arbitrary position than Walpole had
filled. Trusting to his favor with the King, which was one
asset he possessed in abundance, he ignored all else; "Give any
man the Crown on his side", he was accustomed to say, "and he
can defy everything." V/alpole 's fall might have taught him
1 Morley, V/alpole
,
p. 92.
2 Liorley, V/alrole
,
p. 199.
Referred to hereafter as L.orley.

how shallow was his maxim. Eventually the King, against his
will, was obliged to allow Jarteret to he dismissed (1744).
This too in spite of the fact that Carteret was now CJeorge II 's
favorite Minister. The King sullenly accepted the changes in
the Cabinet, "enforced by a veiled constitutional lecture from
Hardwicke on behalf of the Cabinet. 'Ministers, sir', wound
up the Chancellor, 'are only your instruments of government.'
'Ministers', was the royal retort, 'are the King in this coun-
1
try.'" Carteret's dismissal is simply another indication of
the weakening of the King's power.
Upon the death of aenry Pelham, who was Prime Minister
from 1744 to 1754, a curious problem arose and it was settled
in an equally curious way. The question was, who should suc-
ceed to the office? Lord Orford (Sir Robert V/alpole) and
Bolingbroke had died. Bath had lost all power, and Lord
Granville (Carteret) all ambition; Lord Chesterfield was con-
tent with a subordinate position. Pitt was at Bath, was ill,
and had no party back of him. ±his dearth of capable states-
men made a real and not an imaginary problem. Also, who would
l| pick the Prime Minister? The Houses were not to be consulted,
I and so were adjourned, uobody even pretendea to suppose that
the sovereign would choose the delegate himself. Pelham had
risen to power by way of the House of Commons. Charles Fo:k was
probably the ablest man in the House of Commons, but was hated
by the King, and -ioyal favour was still a potent factor as the
Lower House felt decidedly safer with a leader who was on good
1 Robertson, .dingland Under the danoverians, p. 96.
Referred to hereafter as Robertson.

terms vrith the Monarch than with one who was not, A way was
found out of the dilemraa by George himself, who left the seleo"
tion of his successor to the Cabinet members. The outcome was
that the Duke of ^Jewcastle, brother of the late Pelham, who was
probably the :nost influential statesman of ihe time, even if
far from the best, engineered his own nomination and succeeded
to the ?irst Lord of the Treasury, This seems a particularly
unusual event to the writer, because it is the one occasion
which comes to mind in which the King of the eighteenth century
had less power than the King of the tvientieth. If such a situ-
ation existed today and there were so little to choose between
the possible candidates, George Y would undoubtedly have con-
siderable choice in the selection of his leading Minister,
Let us now consider for a few moments the King's re-
lation to "Villiam Pitt, who was the last of Georgell's Minister!
i
and who was Prime Minister from 1756 to 1762. When Pitt came
into power with the Duke of Devonshire for the former's first
Administration, he had pretty much his own way with the King,
He did not have many friends to whom he cared to give places
in the Government, but he did fill the important offices with
whom he wished. Although Devonshire was the nominal head of
the Cabinet, Pitt was the real Premier.
Let us not suppose, however, that the King was entirely
subservient, './hile he could no longer impose a Cabinet upon
Parliament which they disliked, no more could those who led a
majority in Parliament as yet be sure of imposing upon the
•1
i
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Xing Llinistsrs for whom he did not care, ^or a loog time the
opposition of George li to even Pitt himself was decisive.
"iTreqaently , in the end, the iSoverei^n accepted Liinisters in
his Cabinet whom he cared not to have, but often this came only
as the result of compromise, long persuasion, cajolery by his
1
Ministers, or through the influence of someone whom he liked."
The year 1757 brought another political defeat to
George 11. He at length found Pitt's Ministry intolerable and
resolved to free himself from bondage. He failed to persuade
Newcastle to form an Administration and even offered office to
his most bitter enemy. Fox, but in vain. At length he appealed
to one of his faithful followers. Lord Waldegrave, a man of no
political experience, ilewcastle persuaded ^/aldegrave , and not
without cause, that he (ilewcastle) would be able to effect
numerous resignations which would ruin him, should .Valdegrave
attempt to form a Cabinet. Hence, valdegrave was dissuaded
from what would have been certain disaster, and the King was
forced to submit to a Newcastle - Pitt combination. Although
George II was compelled to accept Pitt, the former was not a
nonentity, even now, in the selection of Ministers. As Turner
says, "He could not choose freely himself, but often made ef-
fective obstruction."
The old King was now content; indeed it would have
mattered little whether he were content or not, as he could not
1 Turner, The Cabinet Council of i^ngland in the 17th and 18th
Centuries , vol, II, p. 40.
Referred to hereafter as Turner.
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have emaQcipated himself from so powerful a Ministry. The
vigor and success with which the war had been waged in 'Jerraany
by the Pitt Cabinet, and the smoothness with which all public
"business had been carried on had won over George II. He died
in 1760. Let us summarize in a few words the effect of his ac-
tions on Cabinet government. Though he was fond of war, he be-
lieved in governing as he knew a constitutional monarch should,
and so sacrificed his own strongest predilections and anti-
1
pathies. xhus he gave ./alpole hi::; own way; received Newcastle
as his iiiinister; discarded Carteret, who of all politicians was
the most pleasing to him, and finally, consented to Pitt, whom
he hated.
iVith the accession of George III, grandson of
George 11, we come upon what Hobertson considers the "critical
2
epoch of the history of the Cabinet". He goes on to say
that the Cabinet had advanced because the Grown had accepted
Whig domination and the syndication of its prerogative amongst
a group of i.iinisters who, with the aid of -tarliament , could
make any other Ministry impossible, .low, relying on the re-
vived strength of the monarchical principle, and the desire to
unite by breaking all parties, George III insisted upon his
legal rights to govern as well as reign, and used his great
powers of corruption and influence against, and not in favor
of his Liinisters. If his policy proved successful, there would
1 Lecky, A History of ii^ngland in the 18th Century , Vol. II, p. 566
Heferre"d to hereafter as Lecky.
2 Hobertson, .glngland under the Hanoverians , p. 190.
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be a revival of the theory and practice of departmental govern-
ment under the personal direction and authority of the Sovereign.
The first twenty years of the reign of George III witnessed
euch a deliberate policy on the part of the Or own.
The difference between the Cabinet system of Government
and the Departmental system is vital. In the latter, the Crown
is the connecting link and the motor force in policy; it is
based on the right of each Minister to advise, coupled with his
responsibility solely for the executive action of each depart-
ment. In the former, uinisters are coordinated through the
Prime I.linister, and the necessary consequence is collective
1
responsibility. George Hi accepted the Departmental system
as the guiding star of his political theory. To be willing
and able to carry on the government in accordance with his will
was to be the sole justification for a share in the Administra-
tion. Llinistars might or might not be agreed on matters of
first importance; all the agreement between them which was ne-
oessary was that each in nis own sphere should act as an
agent of the K:ing's policy. The Xing was to be the only ele-
ment of coherence in a Liinistry, and it was to be formed by the
Prime Liinister in accordance with his instructions.
The sympathy of the people was in the main with the
Zing's policy. "A monarch is the historical syqibol of the
emotional ideals of a nation. George III appealed to the
1 For government measures.
E 2ach Minister in the Cabinet was, and is, the executive
head of some department 3uch as, foreign affairs, colonial
affairs, etc.
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loyalty of the people, as the representative of the aational u-
nity and dignity. As for the Prime Minister, he was not very
intelligible to them. They at least had not chosen him, nor
1
was it q^uite clear to them how he had been chosen."
ueorge Ill's conception of government is not en
tirely unjustifiable because his office was in no way curtailed
by lav;, even though the actual powers of the monarch had been
declining. So he might well believe he could regain the
P.jyal power. According to Blackstone in his Commentaries,
"The 2ing of England is not only the chief, but properly the
sole magistrate of the nation, all others acting by commission
from him, and in due subordination to him He governs the
Kingdom. Statesmen, who administer affairs, are only his
2
Ministers." George doubtless felt, and sincerely too, that
if the Grown were restored to its proper place, and if the
exercise of the prerogative harmonized with the unquestioned
theory of the Constitution, the elaborate apparatus of corrup-
tion by which a confederacy of Ministers dictated to the nation
in the name of the King would be dissolved. It would extirpate
corruption at its source, and restore the Legislature to its
3
long lost independence. Unhappily, the new policy as inter-
preted by George In failed to distinguish between the inevi-
table and beneficial results of the growth of Parliamentary
government, and the accidental defects of the ;7hig regime.
1 Blauveult, pp. 243,244.
2 Blackstone, -sook I, Ch. VII.
3 Robertson, p. 221.
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Lord Bute was one of George Ill's early tools in his
attempt to refistablish the power and prestige of the Crown; he
was popularly known as the "King's favourite". When Bute first
joined the Cabinet in 1761 Pitt felt that a reasonably success-
ful alliance might be formed between them because they did
have at least one principle in common; that is, they both dis-
like(- government by party connection. The trouble was, however,
that while the King, through Bute, desired to destroy factions
to establish a personal government, Pitt's aim was that they
should give place to a government by the best men, supported by
the King and the nation.
Pitt had received information that Spain was intend-
ing to join in the war upon the side of j^'rance which was now
raging between France and i:ingland, and at once proposed to de-
clare war with ispain. The King's idea was precisely the oppo-
site as he wisheu to withdraw altogether from the war on the con
tinent. As oalj one of his colleagues. Temple, agreed with him
on this issue, Pitt was forced to resign. Shortly afterward,
Newcastle was ousted by George and Bute, the latter succeeding
to tKd office of First Lord of the treasury. George Grenville
now became Secretary of State in Bute's place. These two resig-
nations are of significance, because they mark the beginning of
the King's climb to power which reached its climax in 1770 with
the long administration of Lord Worth.
Bute was now irirae Liinister and remained so until 1763.
Robertson sums up the political situation very well: Bute was
-
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a Royal favorite, handsome, pompous, and oonceited, and with
intentions that were ambitious to say the least. He was cursed
from the outset, however, "by third rate abilities, vanity, a
total lack of real administrative experience, and the pathetic
persistence with which he mistook aptitude in intrigue for
political insight and statesmanship. "77ith a young and opinion-
ated Sovereign, a great war on hand and a critical international
II
situation requiring consummate skill and tact, the advent to
1
power of this untrained amateur vras a serious public misfortune."
»7ith this description of the new Prime Minister's character
and ability in mind, we can readily see that he would present
no insurmountable obstacle to the realization of the ambitions
of a headstrong young monarch like George III,
The Xing was now free to appoint whom he liked to the
Cabinet and did so. The promotion of urenville, who had ever
been tre-ited with contempt by iritt, was a manifestation of the
new Hoyal prerogative. indeed, the watchwords of the new
government were prerogative and "purity". The Sovereign was
not now a puppet in the hands of any subject, or combination
of subjects. ne was not forced to part with any one whom he
delighted to honor, as his grandfather had been forced to part
2
with Carteret.
1 Robertson, p. 219.
2 Macaulay, iiarl of Chatham , p. 45.
Referred to hereafter as i.^acaulay.
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The King did not obtain his own way without some
trouble. Bute wished to make peace with Spain, but he was
helpless because of the lack of a majority in the House of
Commons. Therefore, it was necetsary to revert to the vices
which were common to the school of V/alpole. Lecky says that
he worst days of V/alpole's Administrai ion now seemed pure,
eory Pox was called in to manage the systematic corruption
f the House of Commons and the pay uffice was turned into a
mart for votes. "Bribes ranging from jt^OO and upwards were
given almost publicly at the pay Office. Martin, the Secretary
of the Treasury, afterwards acknowledged that no less than
1
^£,000 were expended in a single morning in purchasing votes."
The -ing said, "We must call in bad men to govern bad
men." In spite of Pitt, whose eloquence absorbed the Lower
House for three and one-half hours as he spoke against peace,
the Treaty of iraris was included without further difficulty.
Needless to say, the exultation of the Court was boundless,
feut the whole miserable business was a sinister prelude to the
policy of substituting "purity and patriotism" for the selfish
corruption of the -.hig oligarchy. xiute had now done all he
could for v^eorge Hi as Prime kinister. He had cleared the
ground for the establishment of the King's system of government.
But though the stage wa£ set for ^eorge and his revival of the
Hoyal authority, the curtain was not to rise until he had over-
ocme a considerable amount of opposition.
i^ecky, A History of .alngland in the j]ig:hteenth Century^ JII, p.6^
l|2 The xreaty of Paris ended the Seven x ears' .7ar betv\;en iing-
1 ajQd and jj'rance and Spain, xt was unusual in that jingland was
Winning, yet entreated her enemies to stop. The Treaty was un-
>opuiar in iingland.
i
These tactics could not be kept up indefinitely
and Bute was eventually forced to resign his office. Though
dismissed, he was still the principal adviser of the King and
nominated George Grenville as his successor. George was op-
posed to Grenville and sought Pitt; but as the latter had
now somewhat altered his views on the importance of party,
he would not come in v/ithout the support of the Whig families.
The King, now considering Grenville the sole barrier against
the Whigs, changed his policy and determined to support him,
Grenville, the brother of Lord Temple, had seceded
from the vVhlg party and now his learning on almost every ques-
tion was toward the assertion of Royal authority. It is cer-
tain that he came into office with the definite object of carry
ing into action the Tory principle of government and avowedly
to secure the King from falling into the hands of the Vi/hig
1
organization. He possessed a great amount of influence in the
House of Commons, which never hurt any Prime Minister. Those
who put him in power intended that he should play the role of
Bute's puppet. However, he had qualities which had not yet
shown themselves; "devouring ambition, dauntless courage, self-
confidence amounting to pre sv-i^tion, and a temper which could
not endure opposition." We shall soon see that he was
disposed to be nobody's tool.
We have stated a few lines before that Lecky con-
side-^ed Grenville thoroughly loyal to the Crown. There is
1 Lecky/c^/.EX.v. 92.
Z i'lacaulay^ p. 60.

considerable uncertainty on this point however, as several
1
different authors seem to disagree with Lecky. ilacaulay goes
to the other extreme, stating that Grenville considered Parlia"
ment the only legitimate organ through which the voice of the
people could be expressed. All power was from the people, and
to Parliament the whole power of the people had been delegated.
Grenville wished to see Parliament despotic over the nation
2
and also over the court. The writer is inclined to believe
that iiecky is a little at fault here because of events which
followed, ilacaulay has probably exaggerated, but the writer
believes that he was nearer the truth than Lecky. Blauveult
claims that he had been brought up a *Vhig and retained so much
of nhig principles as to have a high sense of the authority of
the nouse of Commons, and that he preferred to derive power
3
from that body rather than from the Xing,
In spite of the fact that Bute and George expected
Grenville would be entirely subservient, he did not prove to
be very passive under the marks of Hoyal displeasure. "On the
12th of Junefl765) , the Duke of Bedford, Lords Sandwich and
Halifax, and Mr. Grenville, brought the King a remonstrance,
which took an hour in reading. When they were gone, the Eing
said that 'If he had not broken out into the most profuse sweat
4
he should have been suffocated with indignation.'"
1 Blauveult, Hunt, & Xeppel.
2 Ilacaulay, p. 61.
3 Blauveult, p. 2£4.
4 I-eppel, Lemoirs of the I-arquis of Rockingham and his Con-
temporarre"£ , Vol. I, p. 212. Kepjel quotes from ./alpole's
George the Jhird . Keppel referred to hereafter as Keppel,

Grenville's position was strengthened in 1765 by the refusal
of Pitt, at the request of the Zing to form a '-'^'hig Administra-
tion. Pitt would not cone without Temple who was one of the
Zing's many enemies. The King's power was further reduced be-
cause the Linister now exacted a promise from him that he would
nevermore consult Lord Bute. The King was almost as much of a
1
prisoner as Charles I had been Y.hen in the Isle of V/ight.
Such were the fruits of a policy which, only a few months be-
fore, was represented as having forever secured the throne
against the dictation of insolent subjects.
His Majesty's aversion to his Liinisters increased day
"by day. Grenville would not give him money to buy gardens which
he really needed, his private orations to the Xing were intoler-
able, and the ministers thwarted his plan for a Hegent, His
resentment was at its height. Now Pitt refused to serve, even
with Temple, and George found no way of escape save by turning
to the great 7/hig families. Grenville was dismissed, and an
Administration formed under the Marquis of Rockingham took of-
fice on July 16, 176£. This must have been a bitter humilia-
tion to George. Yet, though he was for the moment defeated,
he did not mean to give over the rule of his Kingdom to the
Whigs, and for the present anything was better than Grenville's
tyranny.
Let us consider for a moment George Ill's development
from 1760 to 1765. The King in 1765 was no longer the inex-
perienced boy who had five years before been managed by his
Maoaulay. p. 75.

mother and his Groom of the Stole. He had observed the
struggles of parties, and conferred daily on high questions of
State with able and experienced politicians. His way of life
had developed his understanding and character, and he now had
ii
very decided opinions on men and things. IJothing could be more t
natural than that he should have high notions of his own pre-
rogative, should be impatient of opposition, and should wish
all public men to be detached from each other and dependent
upon himself alone, nor could anything be more natural than that
in the state in shich the political world then was, he should
2
find instruments fit for his purpose.
The organization known unofficially as the "King's
Friends" was the principal means by which George finally
achieved his greatest power. They were a body of members in
the Lower House created by the influence of the Grown, and in-
duced by its corruption to vote always and only for the King's
measures, even against the Zing's Ministers. They disdained all
political ties except those which bound them to the throne.
They were willing to coalesce with any party, or undermine any
3
party at a moment's notice. They were the King's friends,
but this friendship implied no personal intimacy whatever; it
was purely a political relationship on a strictly business
basis. These men often occupied minor positions in the Ministry
though not very often in the Cabinet. According to Macaulay,
they were never high in the Administration, but were always to
be found in places of much emolument, little labor, and no
1 Bute,
2 Mac aulay, p. 84.
~Z Slacaulay
, p . . ~"
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responsibility. Their peculiar business was not to support
the Ministry against the opposition, but to support the King
against the Ministry. V/he never the King was forced to give his
reluctant, co^^.sent to a bill which his legitimate Ministers
pushed, thejr^tiivvarted it in Parliament. All complaints against
then were of no avail because of the King» s protection; they
seemed to have a life estate in their offices. The Rockingham
Administration could not repeal the stamp Act, and found
numerous other measures "which it desired to pass balked by this
insidious group of professional politicians.
The Marquis of Rockingham had done everything in his
pov/er to draw Pitt over to his side and to form a coalition
Cabinet with him. Also tlie King had urged that he follow the
same course. It was all to no avail, however, as Pitt, in
accordance with his policy, persistently isolated himself from
all other politicians. If, at this time, he had allied himself
closely with Lord Rockingham, the court v;ould have been help-
lless. And there was nothing to balk such a union, as Pitt and
I
Rockingham agreed on all Important principles, such as condemn
ling the peace, the stamp Act, etc. while their points of dif-
I
ference v/ere on non-essentials. There was nothing to divide
I
Pitt from the \7higs, nor was there anything in common between
Ihim and the "King's Friends" that he should lend himself to
their purposes. "His mysterious aloofness, dictatorial, temper,
and shortsighted identification of party connection for public
ends with oligarchical faction v/recked the Rockingham Ministry,
left Pitt himself without a party^(and) at the mercy of the

King, (sind) of the Sing's Friends "
It is clear that Rockingham came into office simply
as a favour to the King, who felt he must be delivered from Lord
Grenville. The Cabinet was as a whole objectionable to the
Sovereign. The Priir.e Llinister passed all his measures in the
face of an able opposition of which the Xing himself was the
head. Because of this constant friction in the Government, and
because I^ockinghara was too wealthy, too indifferent to office,
too much actuated by public principles, and too closely bound
"by party to yield to George, it was not unnatural that his
Ministry was short lived. He retired from office in 1766.
Pitt now threw over his most trusted adviser, Temple,
and agreed to form a new Administration at the request of the
King. He was not won over by ignoble bribery, but by the
praise, caresses, and promises lavished upon him by the Zing.
George appealed to his vanity by telling him that he alone
could put an end to faction and defy all the powerful factions
in the land united. Pitt had always regarded the person of
the Sovereign with profound veneration, and as soon as he was
brought face to face with Royalty, his imagination and sensi-
bility were too strong for his principles. In fairness to
Pitt, however, we m. st say that he did accept office with high
ambitions to justify the confidence of the nation in a stable
Llinistry
.
The Earl of Chatham's Cabinet was composed of men of
1 Robertson, p. 239.
2 William Pitt had now become the Earl of Chatham.
(•
all shades of political opinion; King* s Friends, staunch V/higs,
friends and enemies of ea.ch other. The Administration was weak,
but it could not easily be overthrown, because the divisions in
the Ministry involved divisions in the opposition. Chatham,
however, was not so well pleased. He discovered when it was
too late that although he had accomplised his scheme of Adminis-
tration, there was so much dissension involved that he was no
J.
longer Prime Minister. V/ith this "mosaic" Cabine t^ Ge orge not
unreasonably hoped to be able to carry out his ideal system of
Government. Chatham's illness, which necessitated his absence
fran almost all of the cabinet meetings, further strengthened
the King's position and he now was able to exert great influ-
ence in the Government,
The Duke of Grafton was virtually prime Minister from
1767 to 1770, although Chatham did not officially reagn his
post until 1768. In Chatham's absence he had become the princi-
pal Minister, though he had no real authority in the Cabinet,
and remained there after Rockingham had refused to establish a
new Ministry at the request of the King. Grafton, hov/ever, was
Prime l.Iinister in name only. He was outvoted in the House of
Commons on some of the most important questions, and desired only
to resign. As early as July, 1767, he told the King that he was
resolved to retire, and that he had accepted the foremost place
in the Cabinet, at the head of the Treasury, only with the inten-
tion of serving under Chatham, not with any idea of being Prime
Minister himself. He was persuaded to remain, though conscious
41^
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of his unfitness for the post. Now, disgusted and indolent,
he remained for long periods in the country, only going to
London once a v/eek to discharge his duties as First Minister of
the Crown. Heedless to say, the King gradually gained full con--
trol of the Ministry and on every important issue the Ministers
followed a line of action which met with his approval. jn
1770 Camden, the Cluncellor, who had weakly bowed to the majority
in the Cabinet previously, was encouraged by Chatham* s fierce
attack on the Ministry to openly revolt against his colleagues,
and was dismissed. Shortly afterv/ard he died, Grafton's
policy — if we may use as strong a term as that — had been
to carry out the ideas of Chatham. Now, filled with misgivings
at his completely Isolated position and a policy opposed to his
convictions, he was driven to resign. He recanted nothing,
modified nothing, and defended his policy boldly and ably in
the House of Lords. He had thrown up his post simply because
he was disgusted with his position, and with the storm of
obloquy around him. Lord North, already Chancellor of the
Exchequer, succeeded him.
V/e nOY/ see the powerful position in which George III
by various means, had placed himself. Before we carry on with
his reign any further we have other developments to consider
which took place betv/een 1720 and 1770. Cur next topic is the
Prime Minister's relation to the House of Commons.

V. Prime Minister's Relation to the House of Commons 1720-1770
walpole's relations with the House of Commons as
Prime Minister are of the utmost importance to us. He it was
who gave us the first inkling of Ministerial responsihility to
the Lower House; that when a Prime Minister loses his majority
in the Representative Chamber , he should resign. This. section
deals with his conception of the Lower House and its importance
in his scheme of Government. There were three possible types of
Government at './alpole's command when he became Prime Minister
in 1721. V/as it to be an absolute rule of the King, or, as
Cromwell sought, a Parliament making laws and voting money, co-
ordinate with the authority of the Chief Person, and not medd-
ling with the executive; or a Parliament containing, nominating,
guiding and controlling its own executive? Walpole found it
easiest, safest, and most natural to work steadily toward the
1
last of these systems. Having made this choice, it was in-
evitable that '.Valpole should conceive of the Cabinet as being
very closely related to the House of Cornmons.
".Vith this in mind, let us examine V/alpole's idea of
the House of Commons a little more fully. The Lower House, in
his day, despite its narrow suffrage, besides its decisive
prerogative of taxation, contained a considerable representa-
tion of the new classes and new interests which were gradually
gaining in influence. Walpole realized the growing importance
of financial questions, and that the House of Commons was the
1 Morley, p. 139.
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place for the solution of these. Also he recognized that his
own ability lay largely in the direction of finances and that
as the Liinister of the tines he must work in the House for the
timeJ. Undoubtedly -Valpole was anxious for power, but not so
much for personal gain as for the opportunity to perform the
service which he believed he could best perform.
In dealing with the House of Commons, a i.linister was
dealing with the living and social forces of the country in all
their vanitj^' The first question was how to organize them for
||
practical purposes, and V/alpole answered it by the principle
of Party. He founded his government directly on the support
of a V/hig majority in the Lower House, -i-njther question in
government was how to keep the Administration in gear with the
party majority, and V/alpole' s solution was a Party Cabinet .
The Cabinet system, then, was the key to Parliamentary monarchy.
This idea of a party Cabinet was unusual because all the Cabi-
^ nets had heretofore been coalition affairs.
As we have intimated, V/alpole was influential in the
House of Commons largely because of his exceptional financial
ability. Control of fitaances, is, as we know, a great source
of power in government, and 'k7alpole was an unrivalled man in
business. V/herever money was concerned, his knov;ledge, skill,
clearness and judgment gave him an authority that was paramount,]
In all these transactions even his enemies had to admit that th^
House of Commons relied more on "Jalpole's opinion than on that
of any other member. But "Jalpole had another source of power

34
in the House of Commons that was not so commendable. He
governed by ©eans of an assembly which was saturated with cor-
ruption; furthermore, he resisted every attempt to improve it.
He employed the vast patronage of the Crown uniformly and
steadily with the single view of maintaining his political posi-
tion, kuch of the expenditure of the secret service money went
to the direct purchase of the support of Lembers of Parliament.
He ^aw to it also that the 7/hig nobles spent their money freely
80 as to secure the small and corrupt constituencies. This gave
the Whigs considerable control over the borough representation,
while of the representatives of the counties nine-tenths were
relatives or dependents of the great i/hig families. His moral
guilt in this matter, however, was neither greater nor less than
that of his successors and predttcessor s , only he took more pains
about it than they. Quoting from Burke, "He was far from go-
1
verning by corruption. He governed by party attachments."
V/alpole recognized the import nee of the House of
Commons, and furthermore, he believed that the Prime Minister
should be the leader of that body. This is shown by his refusal
of a peerage while he was in office. The King wished to re-
ward him for his distinguished services by a peerage. But
Walpole was the first Minister who made the House of Commons
the centre of authority, and he declined to leave it. Though
he loved rank and dignity, he loved power more, and sagacity
told him that he could sway more effectively the counsels of
1 Blauveult, p. 201. Blauveult quotes from Burke ./'Appeal from
the iiev to the Old "iVhigs."
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his time, and exercise more control of even the Upper House,
by retaining the lead of the Lower, He was, as one may easily
imagine from what we have said previously, the leader of the
\7hig party in the Commons. So V/alpole is the first man who
gave rise to the custom that the Prime Minister should be able
to command a majority of this House on Government measures.
But though -^alpole knew that most of his power was
derived from this source, yet he was by no means deaf to public
opinion; this is SArwn by his abandonijent of the iixcise Tax in
1733. ihis bill, as brought out by W'alpole, reduced to its
siipplest terms, wat a proposal to turn the customs duty on the
importation of tobacco into an excise duty on its consumption.
The bill would undoubtedly have greatl;/ decreased smuggling,
augmented the revenue, simplified the taxes, and facilitated
the collection of thera at the least possible expense. So much
for the proposition itself. The bare rumour of it was followed
"by the "fiercest popular outcry that Jalpole or any other
1
Minister in our historv ever encountered," V/alpole doubtless
could have carried the bill in Parliament as it had passed by
large majorities through the earlier stages, but he soon per-
ceived that the temper of the country was such that if his bill
became law, it could not be enforced without bloodshed. Gon-
seciuently, he refused to let it come to a final vote for fear,
not that it might not be carried, but for fear that it might be
carried. "I will not," he said, "be the Minister to enforce
taxes at tht cost of blood."
1 Morlev. v. 171.
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Some contend that Walpole should have resigned when
this measure was not pushed tiirough. He could have carried
the measure, but he knew when it was wise to look beyond the
walls of Parliament. Even today no Minister is bound to re-
sign so long as he commands a Parliamentary majority. He knew
that the country could be perfectly well governed v/liiout an
excise on tobacco, and that to insist on an excise in the face
of popular opinion v/ould be an exceedingly poor piece of govern
ment. To be sure, a modern Prime Minister would have resigned
rather than give up the most important measure of his Administr
tion. But Walpole* s position was not that of a modern Prime
a.-
Minister. No Prime Minister today, out of deference to the
people^ would give up an important measure which he was able
to get through the House of Commons. But no m.odern House would
be willing to pass a measure, to prevent the execution of
which the people would be willing to shed their blood. Walpole
knev/, of course, that the majority in his Parliament did not,
to any extent, represent the Constituencies.
"English political history contains many more dazzling
episodes than this. It contains very fev/ which a constitutional
" i
statesman will regard as more v/orthy of his admiration.
We now come to the event in Walpole ' s career which is
regarded *as his worst political mistake; that is, his failure
to resign the Prime Ministership in 1739 when his advocacy of
peace was disregarded. The object of the proposed war v/ith
Spr.ir was to prevent the search of the colony ships carrying on
1,
, ^-^Y) Vol. T^p.-^V^.
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a contraband trade with the Spanish main. Itiere was much
smuggling going on under the shelter of the Treaty of Utrecht^^
and Spain was at least partly warranted in her high handedness-.
Nevertheless, this process of search as carried on by the
Spanish was regarded by the English as a pure insult. When
Walpole proposed a preliminary convention with Spain, for the
purpose of making an amicable settlement, the opposition de-
nounced the proposition and re-echoed the pass! onate cry of
the nation for war,
WeQ. pole < s reasons for not desiring a war at this time
were logical, and events proved that his advice might well have
been followed. Under a long peace the country was steadily
advancing in prosperity and wealth, and the new dynasty and
parliamentary system v;ere beginning to take root. He knew that
behind the critical relations between Spain and Great Britain
lay equally critical relations in Europe, Because of the
Family Compact of 1733, war v/ith Spain would eventually mean
war v/ith prance. VJar v;ith France would be the destruction of
Great Britain* s peace policy, Nevertheless, the opposition
at length succeeded in its design and v/ar became inevitable,
Walpole, instead of retiring, as he should have done, declared
war himself. He had at length surrendered to the powerful
mercantile class, national sentiment, the coiort. Cabinet and
Opposition, all of wLjpm had been opposed to him.
] The Treaty of Utrecht ended war between Prance and
England in 1713.

77e may be able to understand why he :/ielded, but it
is not q_aite so clear why he failed to resign. i'he Prime
Minister now placed himself in a completely false position by
retaining office though he was an unwilling accomplice in a war
of which he disapproved; he was counteracted by the Cabinet
and reviled b^- the nation. V/hy did he not resign? There are
reasons, to be sure, but none of them seem iqiuite adec^uate in
our eyes. There wac no custom in 1739 requiring a Prime
Minister to resign if he did not have his own way on a ques-
tion of policy. lie doubtless was naturally reluctant to
surrender power to a group whose chief object was not so much
the defeat of his policy as the proscription of himself. Also
his confidence in his own capacity to avert more blunders
fortified his desire to remain. Me knew that his opponents as
they then stood were incapable of forming a strong government,
of conducting a war with vigor, and that not one of them was
camparable to himsef in experience, knowledge, or ability,
either as negotiator or Administrator. As a matter of fact
he did ask the King's permission to resign, though he did
not insist upon it. The King exclaimed, "Will you desert me
in ijy greatest difficulties?", and refused to acknowledge his
resignation. Last, and probably not least, we must remember
that ^Talpole had a great love of power for its own sake.
None of these pleas in V/alpole's defense can ex-
tenuate this grave and regrettable error. His resignation
would surely have made him the most formidable of critics, and
beoanse of the weakness of his probable successors, he might
jI
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well have been tack in power in a short itme. He most assuredly
"would have risen in the opinion of his own age, and have securei
1
the applause of posterity." As the writer looks back upon the
situation, there is one alternative which the nineteenth century
Prime ministers had on such occasions, but of which .'/alpole does
not seem to have thought; at least, if he thought of it he did
not choosd to follow it. That is, he might have appealed to the
people. Even with its attendant corruption, the people, had thei
had the opportunity, would in all probability have been able to
return a House of Commons at a general election which would have
cted in favor of war. .7e cannot conceive of a modern Prime
Minister failing to resort to this expedient, 3o we see that tht
l8 one of the features of the office that was not yet recognized
•V'e now must consider what is perhaps the most important
single event in the entire history of the development of the of-
fice of irrime Linister ; .'/alpole 's resignation in 1742. Before
that time there had been several attacks made upon him in the
House of Corimons, the principal one in 1741, However, the
sands of his Ministry were running out. His physical powers
were collapsing, and the Cabinet seethed with political intrigue
2
and treachery. Kardwicke and IJewcastle supported the King,
wno desired to add a war on the continent to the war with Spain.
Liotions against the conducting of the campaign arose in both
:iouses, but were defeated by slim majorities. At length
the Llinisters failed to carry a vote in the Lower House
1 Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert
Walpole, Vol. IV, p. 125.
2 Hobertson, p. 83.
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on a petition concerning the Chippenham election. The issue
itself, of course, was of relatively little importance, but
the significance of what followed is indeed great. V/alpole
had met other attacks with an undaunted spirit, but was now
convinced that for the head of a Cabinet rent by dissension to
carry on the King's business in defiance of a vote of no confi-
dence by the representative chamber was impossible. On February
2, 1742, he resigned, and on ^-'ebruary 9th he became the jiarl of
Orford and ceased to be a Minister of the Crown.
Before we press our conclusions on the resignation
let us digress for a moment on a minor point. Impeachment was
still naturally regarded as the proper process against
Ministers who had gravely offended a triumphant majority.
It was the only way then known of securing responsibility to
Parliament. But by 1742 the remarkable growth of the Cabinet
system tended to suostitute the joint responsibility of the
whole body of Ministers for the personal responsibility of an
individual iiiinister. To impeach a whole Cabinet would be
practically absurd, and impossible. A political impeachment
would now be a glaring inconsistency, for the Minister can do
nothing except as Parliament sanctions his action. How then
can a House of Commons impeach him for what it has not passively
1
allowed, but actively promoted? 30, with the advent of the
party system had evolved a quiet and peaceful method of deposing
a Minister by action of Parliament.
1 Blauveult, p. 206,
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Heturning to our main point, we will observe
that ./alple finally resigned, not because he had lost the con-
fidence of the Orown, but the confidence of Parliament, V/alpole
could have carried on the Government without the support of the
House of Commons if anyone could, but he had demonstrated, by
both his successes and failures, that it was impossible. "The
house of commons learned as well that it had in its hands ab-
solute power of control over any ininistry by the simple method
of allowing no business to be done until an obnoxious minister
1
retired, " bo he had inoculated the leaders on the i'rea-
sury and rront opposition Bench with the essential doctrines of
2
Liinisterial rights, duties, and privileges. The total effect
of ./alpole's policy as it was finally carried through was to es-
tablish the Cabinet on a definite footing as the seat and centre
of the iixecutive Government, to maintain the Executive in the
closest relation with the legislature, to govern through the
Legislature, and to transfer the authority and power of the
Crown to the House of Commons.
Carteret's Ministry, which followed "7alpole*s, is
simply an affirmation of the fact that the Prime Minister owes
his position to the House of Commons. There could be no real
Prime Minister at this ti-ne because nobody desired the continu-
ance of a "sole or Prime Minister," and if they had, there was
no one capable of playing the part. Carteret came the closest
to fulfilling that position because he possessed the King's
confidence. He was highly unpopular with the people, however,
1 Adams, Constitutional History of 5Ingland, p. 393.
Referred to hereafter as Adams.
2 Robertson, p. 187.

"because under him the war which had formerly been carried on
simply as a fulfillment of a treaty with Maria Theresa, now
hecame one, the cause of which was the dismemberment of Prance.
But the cause of Carteret's failure is more basic than that.
He never had a majority in the House of Commons; he had not
even a party, ne never seems to have grasped the relationship
between the liinisters and a representative House of Commons
under the conditions of Parliament and Parliamentary Govern-
ment. Carteret felt tolerably sure of his security so long
as the 2ing favored him. But when the actual decision had to
be made, George II found that no course was open except the
dismissal of Carteret, even though it was against his wishes.
So we see once more that the Prime Minister owes his position
to the Lower House, and not to the King.
The next event of importance to us occurred during
the Pelham Administration (1744 - 1754) in 1746. George had
never heartily acquiesced in the ascendency of the lelhams, and
1
especially disliked the Duke of Newcastle. The King now
made another attempt to appoint Mixnisters pleasing to him by
appealing to Granville, who was still in Royal favour. The
Pelham brothers, though chief Ministers of the Grown, were
treated with scant courtesy by George II. They saw that the
Zing would get rid of them if he could, so they decided to
consolidate their Administration by offering an office to
William Pitt, who was exceedingly popular outside of Parliament
and who had no little influence within it. Pitt, however, was
I 1 Henry Pelham 's brother.
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decidedly not in the good graces of the King, and the latter
refused to admit him to the Ministry. The Pelhams had forseen
a refusal on the part of the King and had wisely, if perhaps
unpab?iotically , chosen a time to make their demand when he
particularly needed a strong Government; the particular diffi-
culty with which George was confronted at that time was an
insurrection in the country. They, and many others of the
Cabinet, offered their resignations to the King, upon his refusa
to admit Pitt, which v/ere accepted in spite of his precarious
position. George now directed Granville and the Earl of Bath
to form an Acininis tration, but the new Ministers could not
command over eighty in the House of Commons and thirty in the
House of Lords. Scarcely any one of reputation could be
induced to serve under the new chiefs. After two days they
gave up hope of any success and the old Ministers were recalled.
Pitt was nov; given a place in the Ministry.
The Pelham Ministry, then, by a collective resignatio
forced the Crown to admit Pitt to office. Their success was
due to the retention of a Parliamentary majority, and to their
collective action. The Crown found itself unable either to
form a rival Administration or to secure for it Parliamentary
support. George II in two years, was thus compelled to part
with Carteret, whom he trusted, and to accept Pitt, #iom he
1 The cause of this insurrection was the attempt of Charles
Edward, the grandson of James 3[, to establish himself upon the
throne of England. Most of the trouble occurred in Scotland,
but at one time it seemed as if the plot migiht be successful and
it did cause no little disturbance in England.
1
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distrusted. This event simply proved what a united Ministry
could do 7/ hen it rested on the organized control of the Lower
House. Corollaries and sequences of this were reserved for
a later generation to work out and adopt.
pelham ts source of power in the House of Commons
was the same as Walpole's^in other words, bribery. The babel
of parties that had united to crush Walpole, and separated agaiji
to pursue their avn private interests, were now nil sunk into
2
a dull mercenary subjection to the two brothers. Pelham em-
ployed any means to take men out of the opposition, and was
so successful in his efforts that the Opposition w as reduced
to a nonentity. This Ministry came to an end in 1754 with the
^Bath of Pelham,
The Duke of Newcastle, as we know, na7 became Prime
Minister, His relations with the House of Commons seem to
present a peculiar problem to the student, but we will give
I
a brief account of his Ministry from this angle and attempt to
draw some conclusions from it. Horace V/alpole said that the
chief source of his pov;er was "nobody knows what." He was
without secrecy or policy, a Minister despised and hated by
the King and by all parties and Ministers, v/ithout being turned
out by any. Wilmington describes him as seeming to have lost a
half hour in the morning and to be running after it all the res
of the day. By such men as Walpole and Pitt he v/as even treated
with gross contempt. He delighted beyond anything else in the
secret and corrupt management of Parliament, and in the last

analysis this corruption was doubtless the real source of his
power. 'Yalpole wrote his character in a word; "Perfidy."
The Duke of I^ewcastle, despite the fact that he
wielded great influence in the Lower House, naturally could
not lead that body personally. The fact that there was no
le-ader left in the House of Commons was the principal cause
of the general coafusion as to who should be Prime Minister
on the death of irelham. Newcastle did not want more power
than Pelham and 7alpole had enjoyed, but did want as much,
and to obtain that he realized that he needed a man to lead
the House of Commons. He now offered this leadership to Fox,
but the latter refused to serve under I^ewcastle's conditions.
He pointed out that it would be impossible to be an efficient
I Prirae Liinister unless he had full power. So, Thomas Robinson,
a man absolutely ignorant of the ways and means in the House
of Commons, and who was thoroughly useless politically, was
substituted for Foz. Pitt said of hira, "The Duke might Just
as well have sent his jackboot to lead us J"
Newcastle found it now impossible to get on without
an efficient Minister to represent the Cabinet in the House of
Commons, so he again offered the position to ?ox, but with
even less power than before. Fox, strangely enough, accepted.
The situation was highly unsatisfactory to Fox, however, be-
cause it gave him too little power to control policy in ac-
cordance with his own ideas, and too much to escape responsi-
bility for disasters which wrecked the Administration. Newcastle
of course gave him as little actual power as possible, and
II
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looked upon him merely as a tool. Had yox been wise, he would
have resigned in 1755, At any rate, Newcastle eventually
demonstrated that it was not enough even to have an able leader
in the House of Commons; he must also be possessed of suffi-
cient poY/er. In October, 1756, Fox gave up in disgust, and
resigned. Newcastle now recognized that to carry on with pox
and Pitt both against him v/as impossible. After a last appeal
to Pitt, whose support he had sought before, he reached the
conclusion that not one man of sense would trust him any longer
and resigned on November 13, 1756. His resignation is unusual
in that he still had the support of the House of Commons, and
that it was not requested by the King. From all this we can
only conclude that Newcastle was rudely undeceived in his belie
that leadership was a synonym for party manageraent and Cabinet
1
reconstruction. Also the point is brought home to us quite
forcibly, that the prime Minister should be the actual leader
of the House of Commons. Harking back to \Valpole, we see more
clearly the wisdom of his refusal of a peerage.
It seems an inconsistency to what we have pointed out
in the last few paragraphs that pitt should come into power
after Newcastle's fall^ though he could command a follov/ing
of no more than sixteen in the House of Commons. This seeming
paradox v/ill straighten itself out, however.
1. He had changed the portfolios frequently during his tv/o
years to increase his power, but to no avail.

The Duke of Devonshire, an ally of Pitt, who enjoyed
the good will of all parties, undertook the Treasury, and former
what is known as the Devonshire-Pitt Administration, Seldom
has a iilinistry acceaed to power with less apparent strength.
The House of Commons was practically divided between the follow!
ers of .Newcastle and Fox; hut it was Pitt, who had advised no
blunders, to whom the nation in its extremity turned. The last
statement is literally true. It was the nation which demanded
Pitt in 1756. His courage, passionate love of liberty, and
attachment to the creed of the Revolution appealed to the
public. Although he did not carry a single definite measure
increasing the power of the people or diminishing the corrupt
influence of the Crown or aristocracy, "it may be said^ without
a paradox, that he did more for the popular cause than any
ethoi* statesman since the generation that effected the Revolu-
1
tion."
He gloried in the realization that he was essentially
the representative of the people, and declared, even before the
Privy Council, that he had been called to office by the voice o:^
the people, and that he considered himself accountable to them
alone. The great towns, especially London, supported him. His
popularity was greater than any other statesman's. Blauveult
goes further and says that he was not only the first, but the
only Prime Minister to be appointed neither by the King, nor by
Parliament, but by the people. Later Prime Ministers have re-
presented public opinion no less than he, but they have been
1 Xeoky^ A History of j^ngland in the .Eighteenth Oentury ^VJ. g.fi^^i
(i
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appointed "by Parliament acting as the agent of the people; not
by the people acting against the Parliament. It is no wonder
in this state of affairs that George II said to Pitt, "Sir,
you have taught me to look for the sense of my people in
another place than the House of Commons," And though the King
was convinced that Pitt would not do his business, he could
do nothing but accept him as his Prime Minister.
Such popularity in our own day would enable a states-
man to defy all opposition. But this was not the case in
1757 and Pitt soon found himself incapable of conducting a
Government without the assistance of borough patronage and bhe
aristocracy, or of resisting the hostility of the Grown. Pitt
was ignorant and disdainful of political organization, and
party tactics, and his Ministry had many enemies. Also his
influence with the King and the general public had waned some-
1
what because of his intervention on behalf of Byng. But the
main reason for his fall was that he could not obtain a vigor-
ous support in the House of Commons. He was still the favorite
of the people, but scarcely had a party in the Lower Chamber,
His dismissal was indeed an act of personal sovereignty on the
part of the King, but it was one which would never have been
ventured upon had the Minister possessed an enthusiastic fol-
lowing in the Lower House. Thus it was proved that even con-
spicuous ability and great popularity were alone not enough
to assure success to the leader of the House of Commons; he
must have a following in that House.
1 John Byng was an Admiral in the British navy who was court-
martialled and executed for his action, or lack of action, at
Minoroa dur ing the ^eve^o^ I^a^ea^ ¥aa?^
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Upon Pitt's dismissal in 1757, his place was taken by
the Duke of Cumberland, a man who was widely detested, but who
was very close to the King. The former Prime Minister, hoirever
was now acutely aware that he could not maintain himself in
office except by a coalition which would enable him to command
the Eouse of Commons, With this in mind, he turned to Jew-
castle, who had taken no steps to supplant him in the govern-
ment, Pitt's nature was still very dictatorial, in spite of
the fact that he was seeking aid, and the two could not at
first agree on terms. After some bargaining, a comrroraise
was arrived at, and Pitt was again virtually Prime Minister,
Newcastle brought to the coalition a vast mass of power which
had descended to him from »Valpole and Pelham, while Pitt, on
the other hand, had what Newcastle wanted: purity and elotiuenoe
Each occupied a province for which he was well qualified, and
for the time being, at least, neither ha^ any inclination to
intrude into the sphere of the other, i^ewcastle took the
Treasury and the disposal of bribery money; Pitt was Secretary
of State with the direction of the war, and of foreign affairs.
In time, however, all eyes were directed to Pitt, and I^ew-
castle's existence was forgotten except by those who were look-
ing for places, He grumbled, to be sure, but for the most part
his fears and suspicions w^re kept to himself, j3ute proved to
be troublesome more than once, but on the whole Pitt's path was
absolutely cleared of obstacles. He had inspired every class
in the country with his own unconquerable spirit, and had at

last won the complete support of the King. Furthermore, because
almost all the worthy men were included in the coalition Gabineti,
r
\
there was no organized Opposition in Parliament, and Pitt found
himself absolutely supreme in the House of Oonimons, As Macaulay
puts it, "Several years passed during which Parliament seemed to
li
have abdicated its chief functions. The Jourhals of the House
Commons, during four sessions, contain no trace of a division on
a party question. The supplies, though beyond precedent great,
1
were voted without discussion."
This peaceful state of affairs in the Government lasted
until 1761 when the que tion of war with Spain came up, Pitt waii
prepared to take the responsibility of such a war, because of th.^\
"Family Compact" which had just been concluded, and was resolved
to strike at once. The King, on the other hand, was strongly op"
posed to Pitt in this matter and was much irritated by his con-
duct. In three successive Cabinet Councils the question was de-
bated, and at length, Pitt, finding himself supported only by
Lord Temple, rose with great warmth, declaring that he was calle(
to the Liinistry by the voice of the people, to whom he considered
himself accoi"! ntable for his conduct, and he would not remain in
a situation which made him responsible for measures which he was
2
no longer allowed to guide. His resignation in 1761 was a pub-
lic calamity as it deprived the Administration of the one great
master of higher leading, and left the self-willed King, and the
inexperienced Bute to manipulate the situation as they pleased.
1 Macaulay, p. 22
^
2 Lecky, Vol. Ill, p. 37.

Although George Grenville was the leader of the
House of Commons in 1762, Bute, largely by virtue of his inti-
macy with the King, became Prime Minister. As we have seen
previously, Newcastle did not go out of office with Pitt but
lingered until the early part of 1762. Bute now undoubtedly
committed a great error in forcing him to resign, for if
Newcastle had been suffered to j^y at being first Minister, as
he had throughout the previous Administration, Bute might
securely and quietly have enjoyed the substance of power. Now,
by the severe methods of the King, largely exerted throu^
the channel of Bute, the 'Vhigs were again united into organized
opposition. They came more than ever to be considered as the
popular party, bee. use they professed to uphold the rights of
the people against an undue exercise of the prerogative.
Bedford and MansJield constantly opposed Bute in the Cabinet, aijid
he soon found .himself Isolated in that body. He saw that there
was not only danger of falling himself, but of bringing his
master also to ruin, and so, he resigned on April 8th, 1763
after having been in office only eleven months.
Although the 'Vhig Opposition may have been a powerful,
factor in causing his resignation, the real reason for it v/as
his terrific unpopularity with the nation as a whole. Bute had
succeeded in breaking up an all-pov/erful Administration, but he
had also Fiade himself the most hated Minister since Strafford* s
day. There were several reasons for this. He was on very
familiar terms with the King, and no character in England is
more detested than a Court favourite; the scandal about the

relations of Bute and the King's mother was eagerly accepted;
and his Scotch nationality particularly counted against him in
England. All this gave rise to the cries of the mob, "No petti
eoat Government; no iScotch Minister." So unpopular was he, says
Lecky, that he could not appear unattended and undisguised in
the streets, and at times even his life was endangered. Bute
had no great resolution of character, was weak in health, and
had nothing to gain b^, staying in office, so it was no wonder
that he soon quailed before the storm. All this shows the grow
ing power of popular opinion in English government, even in the
selection of a Prime Minister, who certainly in those days was
not dependent upon the electorate for his power. Grenville now
became ^'irst Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the iiy-
chequer. (1763)
The Adipinistration of Grenville(1763 - 1765) is with-
out significance for our present purposes. That of Rockingham
(176£ - 1766) which followed it, is chiefly notable for the
part which Pitt played in it, or rather failed to play, so we
will consider it from this angle. Before we do that, however,
to explain Pitt's actions at this time, it is essential that
we acquaint the reader more fully with Pitt's ideas of govern-
ment, and of party in particular. Robertson says he completely
1
misinterpreted the working of the Parliamentary system. He
never seems to have realized the vitalizing secret that under-
lies the conditions of Parliamentary self-government; that the
deliberate association of public men ior public ends is not a
trick but a duty, and that party is not a faction, but the
i --tODertson, p. ii^ij.
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reauLization of that duty. His strange neglect of the machinery
at his hand put him at the mercy of George III. "Without the
support of the collective cooperation of colleagues united by
a common creed a King's Minister must either become the King's
1
tool or the King's enemy, fighting alone a hopeless battle."
With his passion for imperialism, freedom, and reform, he could
have united the old and new V/higgism, but didn't. He was anxi-
ous to assist in dissolving political connection, but he made
far too little distinction between "gangs of knaves associated
lor the mere purpose of robbing the public, and confederacies
2
of honorable men for the promotion of great public objects,"
Uor had he the sagacity to perceive that the strenuous efforts
which he made to annihilate all parties tended only to establish
the supremacy of one party, and that the basest and most hateful
3
of all. bo much for Pitt's views on party.
With this view of iitt, it is easy to see why, when an
appeal was made to him to do so, he refused to take office undei
Rockingham. Rockingham's Government was based on the influence
of the I'/hig Houses and not on the good will of the Crown and
people. ./ithout him the Rockingham Ministry did not have a
ohance of permanence and gradually became weaker. Difficulties
which had stood in Pitt's way were removed by one means or
another, and finally George seized the opportunity of ousting
the existing Ministry and replacing it with a more comprehensive
Cabinet with Pitt at the head. His statement on acceptance was
1 Robertson, p. 242.
2 Macaulay, p. 89.
3 The King's Party.

that he was delighted "to defend the closet against every con-
tending party"; against, that is, the great V/hig Houses and
1
their connections. Pitt regarded party with such little atten-
tion that he was persuaded by the King to accept a peerage and
he now became the i^iarl of Ohatham in the House of Lords, where
he would be even more independent of the affairs in the Lower
House. The main secret of his unrivalled influence, as we have
seen, was the conviction of the people that he owed his power tc
them. He had been in the midst of the corruption of an essen-
tially aristocratic Government, the great representative of the
democracy of England. L^ow the spell was broken. "The revulsior
2
of feeling was immediate and irrevocable," Furthermore he lost
what power he had in the House of Commons oecause there was no-
body else in the Ministry who had the authority and ascendancy
over them that he had. His best representative there was now tlie
irresolute Conway. In short, Pitt's project of breaking up
and ruling over all parties, completely failed. Having offended!
and exasperated the iYhigs, he found himself at the head of an Aqp
ministration composed of the "King's Friends" who had thwarted
3
him, and of discordiint elements over which he had no control.
As a matter of fact, there was so much discord in chis Cabinet
that we can hardly consider Chatham to have been a real Prime
Minister; certainly he was not such in the modern sense. 77e
have already seen how his administration came to an end with
his illness in 1767.
1 Hunt, p. 73, from the Correspondence of Conway to Hertford.
2 Lecky, Vol. Ill, p. 123.
2 Hay, Const it ujj.Qnal History of -England, Vol ^ T, p^ 4fi,
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After secession from business for nearly three years,
Chatham reappeared on the political stage with a changed attitude
toward Rockingham, His endeavor to crudh that party had evident"!
ly been in the expectation that the power thus subtracted from
them would be added to his own share, but he discovered too lat^
that he had been a mere instrument in the hands of the Court. He
now believed that only a thorough union between those who thought
alike on political subjects could save the country, and with
that in mind he sought an alliance with the Rockingham party, it
is surely evidence enough of ^eoxge ill's power in Parliament irj
1770 that he felt strong enough to ignore this combination, once
invincible, and call in the Jorth Administration.
It may prove interesting at this point to say a few-
words concerning i^dmund i3urke's views on party and his attitude
toward Chatham's conception of party. Burke saw in it the sole
method of putting an end to the iuipotence of successive Admini-
strations and restraining the influence of the Grown, "Hovi" men
can proceed without any (party) connection at all is to me utter
1
ly incomprehensible." Ihere are "ambitious men of light or no
principles, who in their turns make use of all parties, and
therefore avoid entering into what may be construed into an en-
gagement with any. Such ... was in a great measure the late
Earl of Chatham, who expected a very blind submission of men to
him without considering himself as having any reciprocal obliga-
2
tion to them."
1 Lecky, Vol, III, p. 213, quoting from Burke's Thoughts on the
Cause of the Present Discontents .
E Lecky, Vol. Ill, p. 217, quoting from Burke's Correspondence. i|i.
2 76 ,2 77 .
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The Influence of the Court was so great that in
both Houses it cominanded. a steady and unflinching majority.
After a violent ferment in the nation, wrote Burke, as remai
able a dedness .has succeeded. The people have fallen into
a total indifference to matters of any public concern. Such
was the general situation in 1770.
Cabinet Unity - STjprem.acy of Prime Minister in Cabinet
1700 - - 1770
We nov.' revert to the Walpole Administration for
the last time, and will consider Walpole and his successors
from the standpoint of their relations with their Cabinets;
in other v/ords hov/ much unity there was in t?ieir Cabinets, and
how much authority these eighteenth century Prime Ministers
enjoyed over their colleagues. In the Cabinet of the nine teentj|h
century it was regarded as essential that the Ministers should
act as a unit in matters of Government policy, and that the
Prime Minister should be supreme in the Cabinet. In other
words, there should be Ministerial responsibility among the
Cabinet members, as well as to Parliament; each Minister should
act and speak, at least outside of Cabinet meetings, in accord
with his brother Ministers, ^furthermore , each Minister must
hold the same views as his Chief on Government measures, or
resign from the Cabinet. Walpole did not completely establish
these precedents, by any mears, but he did take considerable
strides in that direction. Let us examine his administration
from this angle.
II
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Walpole it was who, as Prime Minister, first ousted re-
'bel Ministers from the Cabinet; Carteret, Hoxborgh, Townsend.and
the opponents of the Excise lax are examples. \'le will examine
each case in turn. First we quote .Valpole himself as it shows
his attitude toward such Ministers. "A (Prime) Minister must be
a very pitiful fellow... if he did not turn out those who pre-
1
tended to meddle with the civil government."
Carteret was the Foreign Secretary in the u'alpole-
Townshend Cabinet. Let us first briefly outline the actual
circumstances which led up to his dismissal, and then discuss
it for our purposes. lowLishend and ..'alpole had inherited, from
the previoub' Administration the French Alliance^ which was to
secure for the Emperor the Cerras agreed by the treaty of Madrid.
By 1723, owing to the death of the Regent of Orleans and of
Dubois, the French policy was no longer in the hands of the
authors of this Alliance, and the Anglo-French understanding
alone prevented France from forming a Franco-Russian Alliance.
Carteret sought to checkmate Russian ascendancy in the Baltic;
but he also sought to strengtiien his position by Court influ-
ence, instead of by solid political connections. The union
with France was now held as essential to the peace of Europe
and England, so the Ministers v^ho held the most credit at the
Court of Versailles were held in the highest estimation by
George I. IJaturally it was a matter of great concern for Town-
ahend and Walpole to have their own confidential ambassador at
Paris, and by these measures to prevent their opponent, Carteret
1 Robertson, p. 187.
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from preserving his weight in the Cabinet. It was in their in-
terest, therefore, to obtain his removal and to substitute some
person in whom they could place implicit confidence, whose ap-
pointment should prove acceptable to the French Court, and con-
vince both friends and adversaries in England of their ascendanc,
1
in the Cabinet. Carteret failed to gain more favor with the Kin
for the latter was convinced that the adoption of the violent
measures proposed by the ]?'oreign Secretary against Russia must
a.
have involved England in^war \.ith the Tsar, and also ueorge was
satisfied with the prosperous state of domestic affairs. So the
young Duke of I'lewcastle took Carteret's place without further
Royal objections, and ./alpole's right to direct the sphere of
Foreign Policy with Ministers of his own choosing was establishe
(1724) . Carteret was transferred to the Vice-Royalty of Ire-
land , which meant he was virtually excluded from the Cabinet.
Ballantyne's view of the Carteret episode is doubt-
less prejudiced, but it does give us an idea of how Walpole's
actions have been judged by many writers. In V/alpole's Cabinet
to be a mediocrity was to be safe. Carteret would not be a
mere political nonentity, and as V/alpole's "frightened
Jealousy" would tolerate nothing else, Carteret, after three
2
years, accordingly had to go. Also, the fact that Carteret
was in favor with the King, owing partly to the fact that he
could speak German, did not tend to make him popular with
V/alpole. A fairer view of the dismissal, the writer believes,
1 Coxe, .Talpole's Memoirs, Vol. 11, p. 109.
2 Ballantyne, Carteret, p. 67.
1•
<
1
is this. To the charge of Walpole's jealousy of power in otherj^
in his Cabinet it is sufficient to say the Garteret was quite as
"busy in striving to remove V/alpole and Townshend, as they were
in excluding him, finally, "Walpole would have stultified him-
self and ruined his whole policy if he had allowed a minister to
remain in charge of so momentous a branch of business as foreign
affairs", who felt he was superior to his position and refused t|))
1
co'operate with V7alpole himself. The Garteret displacement was
^Yalpole's first step toward showing that he would not tolerate
insubordination by Cabinet members.
The ousting of Roxburgh is simply another move by 7/al-
pole in the same direction. Soon after the Prime Minister was
rid of Garteret a kill was passed levying a tax on ale in Scot-
land, and there were disturbances in that country as a result of
it. The Duke of Roxburgh, Secretary of State for Scotland, did
I
his best to help on these disturbances, and was dismissed from
the Cabinet for his pains.
The displacement of Townshedd, who was V/alpole 's
brother-in-law, in 1729, marks the definite establishemnt of
Walpole as the undisputed head of the Cabinet. The Administra-
tion which replaced Stanhope and Sunderland in 1721 was a busi-
ness partnership of V/alpole and Townshend in which the chief
control of affairs fell to Townshend as Secretary of State.
As finances were really the dominant issue, and as Walpole was
occupied with the "Zing's Business" in the Commons and in finance
1 Morley, p. 70.
i
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Ihe was regarded as the Prime Minister, though the two really
were coordinate in authority. Upon the accession of George ll
in 1727, however, walpole's friendship with Caroline nov/ gave
him the sane preeminence in the councils of the King that
Townshend had in the previous reign enjoyed by his favour with
the Duchess of Kendall; this change swung the balance in
V/alpole's favour. Walpole had early realized that the situa-
tion of each having a sphere of power was a decided weakness, and
that a trial of s trength would have to come eventually. The
real issue came as it had with Carteret, in the field of foreign
policy. Townshend, with France as an ally, was eager to build
up a counter -European trade system, and in September, 1725, con-
cluded the Treaty of Hanover, an alliance with Prussia. He also
desired to break with the Empress of Spain and to use the
newly formed confederation to compel Spain to give way. Walpole
was not a little perturbed by the precipitate manner in which
the treaty had been concluded, v/as averse to foreign entangle-
ments anyway, and was reluctant to go to v/ar with Spain, as
such a breach would be an abrupt departure from Whig traditions.
V/ar with Spain, for the tim.e being at least, was averted, and
this was a preliminary victory for Walpole. He had hitherto con
tented him.se If with a general hand in foreign politics, but this
treaty of Hanover was a mioasure of which he definitely disap-
proved, for which he v/ould have to find the money if it v/as to
be carried out, and which he would have to defend in a House of
Commons where it was extremely unpopular. He now openly expressbd
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his views and gave it to be understood that the man who devised
the means, and who persuaded the House of Commons to pass the
measure, must have a dominant voice in the policy. In the
Spring of 1730, ./alpole, backed by i^ewcastle and the Queen, agair:
disagreed with Townshend as to the advisability of a v\ar with
Spain. V/alpole, in addition, managed the House of Commons and
was supported by far more friends than Townshend could boast.
Their differences on foreign policy, on Parliamentary tactics,
on patronage, and the assured position of '.Valpole in the Royal
closet, at length caused Townshend to perceive that his positioc
was secondary, and he resigned on May 1£, 1730. He would not
carry out a policy of which he disapproved; neither would he
join Carteret and other notable V7higs in opposition to his bro-
ther-in-law. So he gave up public life and left Walpole master
in his own Cabinet. This went a long way toward establishing
the principle that Cabinet unity and efficiency required the ag-
reement of Ministers on political principles, in practice the
principles of the most influential chief; also that individual
independence of Llinisters is fatal to an effective Parliamentarj
and Cabinet (Government. It also proved that the Prime l.Iinister's
place "would be automatically taken by the Minister who could
make himself indispensable to his Sovereign and Parliament,
and whose insight and ability would teach hia how to build and
maintain a Ministry based on parliamentary support, and its
capacity to promote national interest, as interpreted by a ma-
1
Jority of the nation's representatives." After the resignation
1 Robertson, p. 51.

of TowQshend, V/alpole had the chief direction of policy; foreign,
domestic, and financial.
'^e come again to the Excise Tax of 1733, which, we will
remember, 7/alpole declined to force through Parliament. ,7hen
this measure became an issue there were several Ministers who
opposed '.Valpole's policy; among them were the Duke of Bolton,
llontrose. Lord Stair, and Lord Chesterfield. 7alpole, when the
affair was over, did not shrink from making the weight of his
resentment felt on some of those who held great posts under the
Crown, and who yet had ventured to thwart the First Minister of
the Grown. Those mentioned above were all deprived of their
places in the Government. V/alpole has been frequently accused oi
iismissing these men because they showed talent and independence,
This is a foolish condemnation, as he only acted upon a principle
irhich is now part of the accepted foundation of Cabinet Govern-
ment, and without which nobody today would either form, a Govern-
ment, or expect to be a member of a Government. It is true that
the bills were dropped, but what Minister would have gone on witi
a colleague who had helped to force him to droj) them.
It is interesting to note that V/alpole thought it
Qecessary to justify himself for removing these Ministers, and
to deny that any servant of the Grown had been removed from of-
fice on account of having opposed measures of the Administration,
'Certain persons', he (Y/alpole) said, 'had been removed because
his Majesty did not think best to continue them longer in service
.... I cannot see, therefore, how this can be imputed as a crime,
or how any of the King's ministers can be blamed, for his doing
62
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what the public has no concern in, for if the public be well and
1
faithfully served, it has no business to ask by whom.'" By thi^
affair we see again that ".^alpole's conception of a Ministry was
not a froup of independent officeholders ijoting as their inter-
ests or ambitions dictated, but a union of the Crown's servants
chosen from a party because they could unite in common action,
2
Dn a common policy, for the benefit of their country.
At this point it is interesting to make one or two
observations on Walpole's assertion of authority in the Cabinet.
31auveult s\y$ that he has often been censured because he never
allowed a man of abilities such as might rival his own to enter
the Cabinet. Yet it i s a fact that, as a rule, the strongest
and most efficient Cabinets have always been those in which
there was the greatest distance between the -^rime Minister and
h-is colleagues. "Cabinet unity, upon which Cabinet efficiency
3
BO largely depends, would seem to be conditioned upon this."
Another point is that whatever may be said for '.Val-
pole's doctrine of Ministerial subordination, his intolerance of
rivalry was constantly adding recruits of talent to the numbers
arrayed against him in the Opposition. Indeed, the strength of
the Opposition that eventually overwhelmed him was mainly due to
the number of men of talent whom he had discarded, -imong them wer
jord Chesterfield, the Duke of Montrose, and Lord Marchmont.
1 Blauveult, p. 237. (Italics are in the original.)
2 Robertson, p. 70.
3 Blauveult, p. 223.
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Walpole's supreme power in the Cabinet could not last |~
forever, however, and as early as 1735 there were vague mutter-
ings of dissatisfaction among his Ivlinisters. He himself was at
least partly the cause of this dissatisfaction, for in the opi-
nion of Torrens, at least, he had become over-confident, care-
1
less, insolent, and drunk with power. He had ceased to believe
in the worth of any judgment but his own, which is not so remark-
able if we consider the flourishing state of the Kingdom at the
time. The Ministers, however, chafed at arbitrary decisions
cone to before they met in council, and slowly the once all-
powerful Prime Minister's omnipotence in the Cabinet began to
9
rot. 7/alpole was forced to consent to the war in 1739 because
the King and most of the Cabinet were opposed to him, and to se-
veral other me sures of which he did not aprrove, as well. The
Duke of iJewcastle was particularly irritating to hira^as he flung
himself eagerly into the hands of the war party. There were, by
1740, not more than three members of the Cabinet upon whom <7al-
pole could securely count, and at the close of his Admihistration
he was not able to exercise much control over his Ministers. He
wished to dismiss ^^ewcastle, but dared not because of his ever
growing influence in Parliament. To conclude, his fall was due
almost as much to the opposition of his colleagues as to the
Opposition in the House of Commons. In his resignation, then,
he was true to his principles. So long as it was possible to
maintain discipline in the Administration, he maintained it;
1 Like all such radical statements, this may be taken with a
grain of salt.
2 Torrens, History of Cabinets , Vol. I, p. 492.

when this was no longer possible he resigned,
AS this is the last occasion which we will have to
devote any attention to Sir Robert Walpole, we will summarize;
as briefly and with as few digressions as possible, his effect
upon the Oxfice of Prime Minister. Since 'Valpole's accession
to power, it was understood that the members of the Administra-
tion should cooperate by acting on Whig principles. They were
still however the Iling' s servants; not the subordinates of a
Premier, Walpole succeeded in impressing upon the '^ueen that th j
weakness imposed on the head of a Government by the toleration
of independence in the ranks of the Ministerial hierarchy re-
acted unfavourably, eventually, upon the Crown. Prom this time
dates the responsibility of a Cabinet to its head, v/ho is in
1
turn responsible for its policy to the Sovereign. Walpde's
creation of the office of Prime Minister was not due to fore-
sight, as we have pointed out before, but to the force of his
own personality, his great political sense, and intuition, and
perhaps to his love of pov/er. The Prime Ministership then, in
its early stages Y/as at first nothing more than a position
naturally created by superior qualities of leadership both in
Cabinet deliberations and in the management of the House of
Commons
,
Although we consider the office of Prime Minister as
essential to effective Cabinet government today, it was by no
means regarded as such in 1742, A protest made against Walpole
in the House of Lords at that time gives us an idea of the
-
_1 ' . ^eadHam , p. JjrS . ' .
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public's oplnloa on the matter. "V/e are persuaded that a sole,
or even a first. Minister is an officer unknown to the lawB of
Britain, inconsistent with the Constitution of this country,
and destructive of liberty in any government whatsoever ; and it
plainly appears to us that Sir R. '.Valpole has, for many years,
acted as such by taking upon himself the chief, if not the sole,
direction of affairs in the different branches of the admini-
1
Etration," V.'alpole himself, at least in public, denied that
he was Prime Minister. 7/hen replying to this charge he declares
"I unequivocally deny that I am sole and Prime Minister, and
that to my influence and direction all the affairs of government
must be attributed .as one of his liajesty's Council, I have
o
but one voice." A little later, however, he practically tells
us his real convictions on the matter when he says, "I will not
shrink from the responsibility that attaches to the post that I
have the honor to hold; and should during the long period which
I have sat upon the Bench, any one step taken by government be
proved to be either disgraceful or disadvantageous to the na-
3
tion, I am ready to hold myself accountable." He felt it ju-
dicious to deny his real status because, although he was not
living in the age of Hitler, he was of the eighteenth century
which was itself none too gentle to political plotters.
One feature of the Cabinet established by Walpole,
which is not used, theoretically at least today, was the so-
called "Inner-Cabinet". It seems convenient at this time to
1 Robertson, p. 83, from Rogers, Protests of the Lords , ii, 10.
£ Blauveult, p. 226.
? BlauVe ul ^^
. p
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trace this through the entire eighteenth century, 7/alpole,
as we might have expected from his character, called meetings
of the entire Cabinet as seldom as possihle. His habit was to
invite two or three of his colleagues especially ac-^uainted witi,
the business in hand, to dine with him at his, or Townshend's
residence, and there decide the policies to be followed. Thus
almost all matters of importance were discussed first in an in-
ner Cabinet consisting of the First Lord of the Treasury, the
Chancellor, and the two Secretaries of State. If it seemed
desirable, the other Ministers were consulted later. These
"Cabinet-dinners" were marked by the peculiarity and possible
convenience that no minutes of the topics of discussion were
necessarily sent to the Sovereign, as in the case of formal
meetings. This may possibly have given rise to the present
custom of the elimination of written reports from the modern
cabinet meetings, though this is no more than a conjecture on
the part of the writer. This arrangement of an "Inner-Cabinet"
may have been partly due to the overwhelming political predomi-
nance of a few great ./hig Houses in V/alpole's day. Between
1742 and 1762 a continuation took place of an "inner" and an
"outer" Cabinet between the titular and the real possessors
of power. IJominal Cabinets numbered from fifteen to twenty,
but within them existed a smaller group of Lxinisters who really
decided policy. During the reign of George III there seems to
have been an inner group of the more important and influential
members, as there had been before, although, of course, the
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Size of this group was never rigidly fized. Throughout the
century, in short, there was for the most part a group in the
Cabinet who came regularly and controlled the meetings. It was
they who oame to the private meetings of the Ministers and held
the informal consultations. These men were the Secretaries of
State, the great officials who ruled the principal departments
of state — the i'reasury. Admiralty, the Army and certain leaders
important through their influence with the Xing, or from their
own ability or ambition; such were ^ardwicke, the Duke of New-
castle, Henry Pelham and V/illiam Pitt. More and more the other
1
lesser Ministers tended to stay away from Cabinet meetings.
At whatever date we choose first to see all the deci-
sive marks of the remarkable Cabinet system which combines
unity, steadfastness, and initiative in the Jbrecutive, with the
possession of supreme authority alike over men and measures by
the House of Commons, it is certain that it was under Jalpole
that its ruling principles were first fixed in Parliamentary
Government, and that the Cabinet system than received the
2
impression that it bears in our own time. The Administra-
tion of V/alpole in unity, discipline, and power was surpassed
"by few of the nineteenth century. By 174E, then, it was pretty
well indicated that there wa;:: to be a Prime Minister who was to
take the place of the King, who was to be the leader of the
party in power in the House of Commons, and to be dependent
upon a Parliamentary majority rather than Court favour; also
1 Turner, Vol. II, p. 80.
a Morley, p. 142.

he was to preside over the Cabinet, composed of men of the same
party, vrho were to act as a unit under him.
The position of Prime Minister implies a peculiar com-
bination of personal qualities; it is interesting at this point
to contemplate Horace V/alpole's conception of these requisite
qualities. "The first quality of a Prime Minister in a free coun
try is to have more common sense than any (other) man." Tact,
business talent, iinovvledge of men, resolution, promptitude, and
sagacity in dealing with immediate emergencies, a character
which lends itself easily to conciliation, diminishes friction,
and implies confidence, are essential and they are more likely
to be found among shrewd and enlightened men of the world than
among men of great original genius, or of an heroic type of
1
character. Carteret, iienry Pelham, Newcastle, Chatham - none oi
them was from this point of view as well fitted for the office
as was Robert ^Valpole, and as a result we find that, for the
most part the unity and character that v/alpole and his system
gave to the cabinet in the first phases of the reign of George II
are but faintly traceable under the leadership of these men.
Upon .Valpole's resignation the Ministers were in-
deed in a powerful position, but they were not so radical as to
attempt to change the whole Administration. There were only
three important replacements, most of ;7alpole's Cabinet being
retained. Spencer Compton, an old favorite of the King, took
'.Yalpole's place as ^'irst Lord of the Treasury, Carteret became
Secretary of State, and Pulteney was given a seat in the Cabine
1
without office. That the whole Cabinet did not change with the
new Prime Ilinister was only natural, as the custom of Ministerial
responsibility to each other was not yet firmly established,
Carteret's Cabinet was marked by dissension through-
out his period of office, and for that dissension there were
several reasons. In the first place the only issue upon which
1
this "Broad Bottom" Cabinet was ever really even partially
united was in the ousting of 'Jalpole. So they were not bound
together by a common opinion on questions of the day, but by an
object which they had already achieved. Also it was evident
that the friends of ^7alpole who remained in the Cabinet could
not well agree with the new section which had driven V/alpole
from power. Anti-Hanoverian feeling in the Cabinet, Parliament,
and nation was another factor which tended to disrupt the
Administration. Carteret, of course, was a favorite of the
King^and this did not tend to make him at all popular as leader
of the Cabinet. Probably the main reason for the lack of
harmony in the Administration was Carteret himself. Without
the Parliamentary leadership, which 7/alpole had recognized
as the only justification for Cabinet leadership, Carteret
attempted to fill an even more arbitrary position in the Cabi-
net than Walpole had enjoyed. Trusting to his favour with the
Zing, he treated the other Ministers as mere ciphers, and ig-
nored, almost completely, the Cabinet, in which he was outvoted
by four to one. He scoffed and ranted at his colleagues and
treated them with supercilious contempt. Carteret did not
1 nnal iti nn Hflhl net.

even control a majority In the Cabinet on foreign policy, in
the realm of which he was supposed to be supreme. By the sum-
mer of 1744 it was evident that the Government, with its at-
tendant disunion, could not meet a new session of Parliament
as it stood. The Pelham brothers and Lord Hardwicke were par-
ticularly jealoiis of Carteret a:^d their political intriguing
was nov; reenforced by public misrepresentation. Everything
that had failed at home or abroad was laid to the charge of
Carteret; indeed, he was even accused of prolonging the war
for his ov/n selfish ambition. The Pelhams, after a little coax-
ing, of various sorts, succeeded in rallying every disconted
V/hig against Carteret. Finally, feeling reassured by this sup-
port, Hardwicke drew up a long Memorial denouncing Carteret's
conduct and policy. Newcastle handed the document to the King
and told him to choose between their resignations and Carteret'
The King in his distress sent for Walpole, who was still very
Influential, though not really in the Government, who advised
him to abide by the wishes of the majority in the Cabinet.
Carteret was thus compelled to yield, and resigned in November
1744. It is true that his resignation was accomplised becai:ise
of the preponderance of the Pelhams in Parliament, but it is
also true that Cabinet dissension was a very Important factor
In forcing his resignation. There was so much dissension
throughout Carteret's tvio years in office that serious question
really
may v;ell be raised as to v/hether he/.vas Prime Minister. Cer-
tainly he was not if we compare his position to that of the

Premier of the nineteenth and feventieth centuries.
In some respects there is a striking similarity be-
tween Carteret's Administration and its successor, that of
Hep-ry Felham (1744 - 1754.) Both were coalition Cabinets,
Pelham had no great authority over his colleagues, and there
v/as a certain amount of dissension among the ministers through-
out the entire decade. The coalition was a political affair as
it professed to include all parties of weight in the state in
coalition. It caipr-ised no less than nine IHikes.
The Pelham Administration was a triangular arrange-
ment, the pov/sr being divided between Pelham, Newcastle, and
Hard;vicl:e. A very slight preeminence was given to Pelham.
Pelham' s authority was precarious, especially while Carteret
possessed in a superior degree the favour of the King, a-'id t'-^is
was demonstrated when Carteret and Bath attempted to form their
Administration in 1746. pelham was somewhat timid, desponding,
and fretful, and had little energy of character or intellect;
nevertheless, he shaved good sense, industry, knowledge of
business, end Parliamentary experience. He v/as content to hold
the reins of power loosely, freely allowing competitors to
office, and permitting much divergence of opinion. He believed
in silencing'&ie Opposition by giving office to its most prominent
members, a policy exactly opposite to that of Walpole, but one
!which was quite extensively followed by other Prime Ministers
'Of the eighteenth century. Fone of these factors, hovever, v/a^S'.
jparticulerly conducive to harmony among the Ministers. The deat
1i
f
of the Earl of Orford in 1745 added to their difference because
the connecting link between his adherents and Pelham was severed
they naturally separated into different parties, some going over
into the ranks of the Opposition. Too, there were differences
among the Cabinet members as to the foreign policy which should
be pursued. Pelham and many of his subordinates believed that
the accession of Prussia must be obtained, or that peace must
be concluded on the most favourable terms that could be pro-
cured; in these views they were firmly opposed b^- the Z^ing,
the Dukes of Cumberland and ij'ewcastle. In fact, throughout the
entire ten years we find that the brothers frequently disagreed
on matters, at times almost to the point of violence. The King
usually supported Pelham, but by 17E1 the latter was so harassed
by feuds in the Cabinet, the contentions in the House of Com-
mons, and the fatigue of his official duties, that on the 30th
of Llarch he is said to have intimated a wish to resign as
Priine Minister. George, apprehensive lest this should dissolve
the Ministry, earnestly begged him to remain. In deference to
his Sovereign, Pelham consented to retain his eminent, though
irksome office, and he remained Prime Minister until his death
in 1754.
Although one or two of the Prime Ministers holding
office between 1754 and 1770 occupied a position of more authori-
ty in the Cabinet than did Pelham, their Administrations, like
his, do not contain re:.l Cabinet unity or Misister ial responsi-
bility to any noticeable extent. The Ministers with whom we are
\
coQcerQed are Newcastle (1754-1756) , Chatham (1757-1762)
,
Bute (1762-1763). Grenville (1763-1765). Rockingham (1765-1766),
Chatham (1766-1767). and Grafton (1767-1770).
The grovelling nature and love of office prevented iTew-
castle from commanding any respect whatever from his colleagues.
Newcastle's jealousy of his ministers amounted to a disease, and
he was determined to concentrate the control of the Government
in his own hands. Pitt and Fox, slighted by the award of of-
fices of no importance in the Ministry, were openly defiant of
their chief. Pitt knew he had nothing to hope for from the Lli-
nistry as promotion had been refused him, and in [November, 1754,
he implored the House of Commons to beware lest it should degene
rate into a little assembly serving no other purpose than to re-
2
gister the arbitrary edicts of one too powerful subject. This
amounted to a declaration of war on Newcastle, which was unfor-
tunate at that time. A cabinet Minister of ability for the
House of Commons was required because with foreign affairs and
subsidy treaties growing more critical the policy pursued needed
defense more than votes, .Tox was as bad as Pitt in ridiculing anld
discrediting not only Robinson but i^lewcastle, and it was evident
that any Prime Minister of common firmness would have dismissed
subordinates guilty of such conduct. Instead, Newcastle , with
characteristic timidity, preferred to make new overtures to Fox.
who eventually accepted them, deserted from the Opposition to
the Chiefs, and disclaimed all connection with Pitt. He was
1 Although he rcrsigned in 1761, his Administration lasted
until under Newcastle.
2 LeadXam. p. 435.
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called into the Cabinet Council in January, 1755.
I^Iewcastle ' 8 conduct was now (175E) a miserable exhibi-
tion of weakness and vacillation. His love of office had become
wa.5
an absolute disease, and the idea of sacrificing it intolerable
to his mind. He was the undisputed leader of a party possessed
of an immense majority in both Houses, yet no Prime I.linister
1
was ever less able to control insubordinate colleagues. Not
merely Vvas there an absence of collective responsibility, but in-
dividual Liinisters asserted their right to vote and speak a-
gainst Government proposals without Jeopardizing their official
2
positions. At length Pitt's condemnation of the continental
foreign policy, as followeu by the Cabinet, became intolerable
even to llewcastle, and he was dismissed from office along with
Legge and Grenville in the fall of 17£5. V/e have already ob-
served how Newcastle was at last forceu to retire from office
in 1756 because he could not lead the House of Commons.
V/e will skip the Devonshire-Pitt Administration as
it has no significance from this standpoint, and consider the
•lewcastle-Pitt regime. Their Administration, characterized
by Macaulay as being the most triumphantly successful Ministry
in Britain's annals, was a typical coalition Government.
Llewcastle and Pitt were co^Jrdinate Chief Ministers, and the
subordinate places were filled on the principle of including
in the Government every party and shade of party; "nay, every
1 Lecky, Vol. II, p. 48^.
2 Robertson, p. 188.

public man who, from his abilities or frcxn his situation,
seemed^ to be either useful in office or formidable in ' ;A
2
opposition." ' It was under this policy that room was
found in the Government for t.vo powerful Whig connections,
either of which might have been the nucleus for a strong
Opposition; the^factions were the Grenvilles and the Bedfords.
^e head of the G-rervilles was Richard Earl Temple a man of
no high talents of administration or debate, but whose great
possessions, turbulent and unscrupulous character, restless
activity, and skill in intrigue would have made him one of
the most formidable enemies a Ministry could have had. He
was made Keeper of the Privy Seal, and his brother, George,
though he was Imown to be conspicuously opposed to the prosecu
tion of the war, became Treasurer of the Navy.
Notwithstanding this checkered array of colleagxies,
Pitt maintained absolute supremacy over his Cabinet until
1760. Upon his first proposition for changing the conduct of
the war he stood single among his colleagues, and tendered
his r e signation should they persist in their dissent. They
at once succumbed and henceforth ceased to have an opinion of
their avn upon any branch of public affairs. So absolutely
was he determined to have control of Government measures, for
which he knew the responsibility rested upon him alone, that
he insisted upon the First Lord of the Admiralty not having
charge of the correspondence. Brougham makes the broad state-
ment that Lord A»son, an eniment authority on such matters,
ly ~ Macaulay, p. 19.

was obliged to sign the naval orders "by Pitt while the vvTiting
1
was covered over from his eyes. So his Ministers vv-ere not
advisers, but servants, being induced to yield to him implicit
obedience, and to leave the individual direction of all opera-
tions in his hands.
Before long, however, these high-handed methods of the
Prime Minister were bound to stir up dissatisfaction in the Gabi
net. Ihe unbounded arrogance with which the Ministers were
treated gradually raised against him much animosity. In the
Council they cowered before hint like school boys, and when
doubts ^ere expressed as to whether sufficient funds could be
raised, Pitt declared that in the case of the smallest failure,
he would at once impeach the Commissioners of the Treasury, or
tlewcactle himself, before Parliament. Thus Newcastle lived in
a state of mingleu fear and resentment, while Fox could not
forget that he had once been deemed the egual of Pitt.
The accession of George III probably had more to do
with the disintegration of Pitt's Cabinet than anything else.
By 1760 there viere two distinct elements in the Cabinet, one
led by LJewcastle, and the other by Pitt, both of which were
distasteful to the King. He knew that no one could be really
King while Pitt was Prime Minister, so he sought to add to the
existing jealousies. He saw that it was to his advantage to
confine the Ministers as much as possible to their own Depart-
ments, and that they ought not to be suffered to form a coherent
1 Brougham, Historical Sketches of Statesmen who fjjurished in
the time of George III (3ssay on Lord Chatham), Yol.I.p.26.
Referred to hereafter as Brougham.

and homogeneous whole. Pitt had long been on the coldest
terms with Lord Bute, the "Favourite", as he was known, and he
proposed a firm union with Newcastle against Bute, Newcastle,
now thoroughly jealous of Pitt, took exactly the opposite course
and proposed to the King that Bute should be offered an impor-
tant office in the Administration. The King sav; the advantages
to be gained and follov/ed Newcastle's advice by appointing Bute
and several other members to the Ministry who v/ere of no ac-
count, except that they were subservient to the King. The
crisis arrived in 1761 when Pitt, as we have noted above, de-
manded instant -.'ar with Spain. The Cabinet, clinging to
diplomacy because of the weakness of the army and the fleet,
refused the demand. Pitt^ siipported by Temple alone^ resigned
because he would not remain in a situation v/hich made him respoii
sible for measures which he was no longer able to guide. It is
uncertain whether Pitt and Newcastle together could have
balanced the natural affection of the people for a new King or
not, but Horace Y/alpole and Macaulay are of the opinion that
such an alliance vvould have been capable of thwarting George
III. The triumphant continental war had captivated the whole
country and, furthermore, Bute v/as not well liked. At least
the union of Pitt and Newcastle y; ould have checked the torrent
which soon carried everything in favour of Prerogative. So
we see that Pitt was humbled largely by a disunited Cabinet.
Newcastle was still the nominal head of the Cabinet,
but Lord ^ute, the recently appointed Secretary of State, was
treated by the King as the real First Minister. He undertook

the chief raanagement of affairs in the Cabinet, and the sole di-
rection of the House of Lords. Even George Grenville, the new
leader of the House of Commons, was not sufficiently consulted,
and the situation grew intolerable. In Llay, 176S , iJewcastle resign-
ed. There is nothing to say of this Administration, except that
it was completely discordant, particularly on the war issue. V/e
have already seen why Bute resigned.
?/e may dismiss the Grenville Administration with but a
word. Lord Sgreraont, whose influence among the Tories was very
great, and Lord xialifax, a man of popular manners and character,
but of nc ability or power, were made Secretaries of State, and
were intended to share the chief power, but the early death of
the first, and the insignificance of the latter left Grenville
almost without a rival among the Ministers. Due to this situa-
tion, together with his leadership of the House of Commons, it
seems reasonable to consider him the nearest ap;^roach to a mo-
dern Prime Minister since Walpole's time.
Of Lord Roc.ingham, Grenville 's successor as Prime
Minister, there is not much to say except that his Cabinet was
far from a unit. This was probably partly due to Rockingham
himeelf , about whom Lecky says that when a Ministry represented
his personal views, "Jalpole himself was not more strenuous in
enforcing unanimity among its members, but when it diverged
1
from his views, Pelham was not more indulgent of dissent.
1 Lecky, Vol.111, p. 105.
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Rockingham did not cause most of the difficulty. The opposition
was powerful as it included Pitt, Granville, the Bedfords and
Temple; but more than that, the Ministry was without its natural
strength, as it had to struggle not only against its avowed ene-
mies, but against the insidious hostility of the King and the
"King's friends". They filled the subordinate places in the Go-
vernemnt, plotted incessantly, and voted fearlessly against theif
chief. In July the Chancellor, Lord ITorthington , who had per-
sistently thwarted and opposed his colleagues in the Cabinet,
openly revolted and informed the King that the Ministry, as it
existed, could not go on. The Ministers were dismissed on July
1
7, 1766, and the King sent for Pitt.
The Cabinet formed by that gentleman must have been
completely satisfactory to the Sovereign^ as all his friends were
comfortably accomodated, and it contained no four persons who
had ever in their lives been in the habit of acting together;
the office of Paymaster wati divided between two men who had nevej?
exchanged a word. The failure of this Administration cannot
be ascribed to any want of capacity on the part of its members;
the fault is entirely in the way the materials were put together
Conciliation was needed, but no Prime Minister was ever less
fitted to conciliate opponents or to perform the delicate
functions of party management. He still ruled the Cabinet des-
potically and in three months had so deeply affronted the Duke
of Portland, still Lord Chamberlain, and Lord Burborough that
they and others retired in disgust. His colleagues were, as thejr
1 Lefilry
,
Vol . 111 . p. 106.

Ihad been in his earlier Administration, merely his clerks for
naval, financial and diplomatic business. These resignations
depleted the ranlcs of the Cabinet to such an extent that Chathar4
was driven to make overtures to the Bedford party, which failed
because they asked for more than he would grant; eventually he
"the at
was forced to admit on their ov/n terms,
/\
The most important public question of the Session
of 1767 related to the affairs of the East India Company, This
problem was a major cause of disagreement among the Ministers.
Grafton and Shelburne agreed with Chatham that the question of
the East India Company's rights should be decided by Parliament,
while Charles Townshend, tlie Chancellor of the Exchequer, strenu
ously recommended an am.icable arrangement with the Company.
Another bone of contention was raised by the taxation of the
American colonies. The Bedford group, with the King behind them
were for the maintenance of the taxes, and coercion if necessary
while Chatham, Grafton, Camden and Granby were for repeal. In
1767, before he could work out further plans of foreign policy,
Pitt was prostrated by the gout for two years, and was thus
practically removed from politics. Crafton was nov/ nominally
the chief, but allov/ed the Cabinet to degenerate into a debating
society. '^.e one man who knew his own mind and v/orked hard was
George III. The ascendancy he had established by 1770 was the
honestl" won triiimph of a personality, narrov; but sincere, and
1
of a system coherent in principle and m.ethod.
1- Robertson, p. 244
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VII, Situation in 1760
Before advancing with Lord Jlorth's Administration,
it seems advisable to examine the status of the Prime Minister
and Cabinet Vihieh had been attained by 1760, V/e choose that
date rather than 1770 because at that time George III had not
stepped in to meddle with affairs, and Cabinet Government was
functioning more normally than it was ten years later. First,
it should once more be impressed upon the reader that constitu-
tional development with regard to the extension of Parliament's
authority, the extension of the part^ system, the evolution of
the Cabinet and of the Pri;ne Minister, are mostly the logical
results of political situations and not of statutory enactment.
In other words, this development is not revealed in the re-
cords. The Cabinet was established in 1760 in the sense that
it was a group of Li.inisters who decided policy, and v.ere depen-
dent upon Parliamentary support. In selection the Grown was
limited by their influence in Parliament, and by their capacity
to agree on a common course of action, add their readiness not
to pursue political differences to open revolt. The leader of
the Government, the Prime Minister, enjoyed a preeminence which
varied in proportion to the confidence he could win from the
Crown, the quality of his own gifts and character, and his
personal and political relations with his colleagues and his
1
party. The title of Prime Minister had come into use by 1760,
1 Hobertson. -p. 189.
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but was still regarded as invidious by Constitutional purists.-^
By 1760 the office of Prime Minister had reached a unique stage,
Before that time his position had been comparatively simple, as
he had been responsible to the King alone. It became simple
again v;hen there was no direct responsibility to any one save
the House of Commons, through which the voice of the people
might make itself heard. But the Prime Minister who, in the
eighteenth century was obliged to please the Xing, both Houses
of Parliament, and the people at large, all four of whom were
2
likely to be at variance, found it no easy task.
One more comment on this period. Though it was com-
ing more and more to be felt that a prominent member of the
Cabinet should be in the House of Commons, it was not thought
necessary that any large proportion of Ministers should be
there. .7e constantly find the phrase, "Loicfc of the Cabinet
GounciiJ.," and there were very few in that Council who were not
Lords. In 1740, with the exception of rTalpole, Sir Charles
'sYager was the only Commoner in the Cabinet, and even he was ob-
jected to by the King. In the Pelham Cabinet of 1744, Pelham
himself was the only member of the Lower House, and he was of
a noble family, being the son and brother of peers.
Now we are ready to examine George Ill's attempt to
upset this beautiful theory of Cabinet Government.
1 Hunt, Vol. X, p. 9
2 Blauveult, p. 216.

B. The Period from 1770 to 1783
I HelatiOD of the King to the Prime Minister
The period we are now to treat was certainly a most
critical one for the Cabinet and Prime Minister. It was during
these thirteen years that George III attempted to assert his
authority to the full, and to literally rule. For a time it
appeared that he would succeed. Had the American Revolution
been unsuccessful, he might well have realized his purpose.
Various developments, however, thwarted him, and by 1783 he
found himself in no stronger a position than he had been in
when he acceded to the throne in 1760. Let us examine this
interesting period.
As we have said, upon Grafton's resignation in
1770, Lord iJorth became li'irst Lord of the Treasury, retain-
ing also the Chancellorship of the iixchequer; George III, of
course, is the predominant figure during this period, and it
is with him that we are concerned more than with any other one
man. As we have observed, he hoped to attain absolutism by
the obliteration of party lines; but now, after a ten year
struggle to rule as well as reign, he found himself the leader
of a party, and as such, virtually the Prime I.Iinister. Robert-
son says that he would have gained nothing he did not already
possess by presiding at Cabinet meetings or by defending Ministe-
rial policy in the House of Lords. The policy, the party, and thcj
management were under Royal control. The correspondence of Lord

North reveals this. In writing to his Cabinet leader concern-
ing the Royal Marriage Bill in 1772 he said, "I expect every
nerve to be strained to carry the Bill.... It is not a question
that relates to Administration but personally to myself, there-
fore I have a right to expect a hearty support from ev(er)y one
~2
in my Service, and I shall remember Defaulters. "
\Ie have already seen that Oeorge Ill's power was due
to the corrupt organization of the "King's Friends", and there
in no need to go into that phase of the subject any further.
It is enough to say the funds spent to secure votes in the
Lower House were so great that they staggered even George III
himself; as many as one hundred and ninety-two members of the
House of Commons held office under the Government. His power
was not due solely to bribery, however. There was a steady
consolidation of Toryism, in other words, of classes opposed
in sentirr.ent to change, rallying to a strong Crov.n and dis-
gusted at the violence of the opposition. By 1773 George Ill's
political predominance was firmly established and his will was
absolute lav; to his Ministers. The balance of power, which
during .Valpole's Administration had shifted from the Lords to
the House of Commons, was shifting from the Commons to the
3
Crown. As we have said earlier in the essay, George's
intentions were of the best, as he wished to do nothing but
1 Robertson, p. 252.
2 "Letters of George III to Lord North", Feb. 26, 1772;
Brougham, Historical Sketches, Vol .1 ,p. 79. The italics are
mine.
3 Hunt, p. 123.

86
what law and custom, as he interpreted them, entitled him to do.
He appreciated more than his Ministers the gravity of the issues
he also recognized that after 1770 his ideals of Government were
at stake.
As Lord North was at first the willing instrument
through which George III worked, he, as Prime Minister, natural"
ly enjoyed all the power in the House of Commons of which he had
need. Until 1778 relations between the Monarch and his Premier
ran smoothly enough. The war with the American Colonies was
considered to he well in hand and there was not a great deal els
to bother the Government. By 1778, however, complexion of mat-
ters had changed, and i^orth now realized that the Government was
unequal to the situation. Consequently he offered his resigna-
tion to the ^ing, and advised that Chatham, who was still in
high public favor, be appointed to establish a new Ministry. Ac-
cording to present ideas George should certainly have been gui-
ded by the assurance of his First Minister, and allowed his new
;
Cabinet to act as it thought best. Instead, he pleaded with Norljh
to stand by him. "However, you may now and then despond, yet ...
you have too much personal affection for me and sense of honour
1
to allow such a thought to take any hold of y(ou)r mind." Worth
was not put off so easily, and repeatedly in his letters, es-
pecially those of 1778, offered his resignation. Another answei
from George to Lord North is as follows, "If I will not by your
1 "Letters of George III to Lord North", Jan. 31, 1778;
Brougham, Historical iSketches , Vol. I, pp. 103*104.

advice take the step wh. I look on as Disgraceful to myself, and
destruction to my Country and family, are you resolved, agree-
able to the iixample of the D, of Grafton, at the hour of danger
1
to desert me?" Lord Ilorth, when he found he could no longer ap
prove the policy which he was required to pursue, and of course
defend, was bound to quit the Councils of his unreasonable Sove-
reign; but he failed to do so. He most assuredly should have in
aisted upon his resignation, regardless of any kindly feelings
which he ziay have had toward the King. He could not have ren-
dered a worse service either to the ^ing, or to the people, than
he did by failing to resign, for he enabled a monarch to rule in
his own person, dictating the demands of his own violence or cap
rice, through servants who disapproved of his measures.
George Ill's retention of power after
1778 was pure obstinacy; this is <^hown by his refusal to offer
the Prime Llinistership to Pitt. "'Every rank", wrote one of the
foremost bankers in London (at that time/, "looks up to Chatham
^ 2
with the only gleam of hope that remains.'" IJorth, Bute, Mans-
field, Grenville, and even liockingham were all in favor of
calling in Chatham at this Juncture. Alone, among the hostile
parties, the King refused to consider him. The main motives
that influenced George at this time were personal. "IIo advantage
to my Country nor personal danger to myself can make me ad-
dress myself to Lord Chatham or to any other branch of
1 "Letters of George 111 to Lord t^Jorth", liar. 22, 1778;
Brougham, Historical Sketches , Vol. I, p. 112.
2 Chatham Correspondence , iv, 493-506, 511-512.]Lecky,Vol.IV,p.87
--
1
(
opposition. Honestly, I would rather lose the Crown 1 now wear
1
than "bear the ignominy of possessing it under their shackles,"
The opposition to George III and his
policy was steadily becoming stronger. It became their object
"to leave no stone unturned that would svieep out of power the
men, and destroy before it was too late the system of government
and measures, intrinsically pernicious, that infallibly were
2
driving Great Britain to Niagara." Its leaders gradually
united, and Chatham's death and the course of events brought
Shelburne, Camden, and Grafton into line with Rockingham,
Fox, and Richmond; while the popularity of the existing Ministrj^
steadily waned. North was now more anxious than ever to resign,
and two or three attempts to reconstruct the Ministry proved
of no avail. Shelburne and others were approached, but the
2ing refused their sweeping demands that the existing Ministry
be displaced en bloc . If he had been wise he would have ac-
cepted their terms without undignified protestations to a
"policy which in a few years was forced upon his acceptance ...
at the point of the parliamentary bayonet." The disastrous
year of 1781 turned public opinion steadily against the Govern-
ment, as the defeat at Yorktown and the Fall of Minorca \\eice
especially disheartening. On ujiXch 20,1782, North resigned.
In the last analysis, had Uorth been trile
1 "Letters of George III to Lord North", Mar. 15, 1778;
Brougham, Historical Sketches
,
Vol. I.jsp. 108,lo9
2 Robertson, p. 266.
3 Lewis, assays oh the Administrations of Great Britain from
1783 to 1830, p. iT.
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to his convictions, George could not have carried on his system,
as he could not have formed another Administration which would
have acted on the sane principles. His defect was that his
loyalty to 'George III --ras stronger than his will, industry, or
convictions, and that he permitted his judgment to be overruled
"by the pertinacity and fixed ideas of the King. Lecky sums him
up "by saying that he carried out with greatly superior abilities
a policy not very different from that of Bute. North, by the
way, would not consent to being called Prime Minister; he did
not consider himself as acting in that capacity, at least so
he said.
The power of the Grown had been displayed from 1778 to
1782, and also the will of the King, in the maintenance of the
Struggle for four years against military failure, maladministra-
tion, and a Prime Minister pleading to be relieved of a task he
had disliked from the first. It had now become evident, however
that it was only possible to govern by one party and one policy,
and the King reluctantly submitted to the inevitable. He ac-
cepted Rockingham as North's successor, and the Whig party
again rose to power. One reason for the failure of the King's
system was that it deprived him of the best minds and characters
at his disposal, for the best minds refused to surrender their
intellectual independence to an inferior dictator. They either
2
rebelled or were driven into the Opposition. Thus was the
Zing vanquished.
1 Lecky, Vol. Ill, p. 138.
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Rockingham's terms on coralng into office
were that he might make peace with the American Colonies on
the basis of their independence, and also that he might bring
forward measures for the abolition of office^, the exclusion of
contracts from Parliament, and the disfranchisement of revenue
offices; measures which must tend toward a reduction of the
influence of the Crown • The King was in great distress, natural
ly, but there was no escape. Shelburne in turn had refused to
form a new Administration, and Rockingham, therefore, became
Prime Minister for the second time. But though George III
had given Rockingham office, he refused to give him his confi-
dence and good-will; from the first he was waiting for the
chance to profit by every false step and every difference which
might arise in the new Cabinet. Rockingham died on July 1st,
1782, and so did not have to contend with His Majesty very long
With the death of Rockingham the Crown
devolved upon the King of England, as the party who wished to
restrain Royal power was leaderless. The Duke of Richmond had
potential qualities, but was unpopular and hated by the King.
Pox was another enemy of George; Burke was not even in the
Cabinet. So the Sovereign at once summoned Lord Shelburne to
be Piis t LO'id of the Treasury, which caused Fox and several
other members of the Rockingham group to resign. Shelburne *s
political theories were somewhat like those of Chatham, as he
desired to stand aloof from party organizations, and without
abandoning to any extent any political principle, to employ
1
them for his own ends. He was incapable of such a policy, how"|
ever, "because he had neither the commanding genius, nor the
necessary popularity (he was almost as unpopular as Chatham
had been popular) , and he lacked real skill in the management
of men. Shelburne was not apt to be a mere puppet to the King,
who appears to have supported him solely through his detesta-
tion of Fo2, He wae forced out of office on February 24, 1783
by the Fox-North coalition, after a Ministry of no further sig-|
nificance to us.
The situation in the House of Commons on
February 14, 1783 was as follows; one hundred and forty
followers of Shelburne, one hundred and twenty of North, and
ninety of Fox. ilaturally, when the last two factions united,
the former had to give way. The combination was declared to
have been formed on the basis of "mutual good will and confi-
dence'' which naturally sounded like poppycock, more or less,
to the ears of the multitude, because the two leaders involved
had been fighting intermittently for years. The coalition was
not wholly incongruous, as neither of the men was apt to be
bound too much by political scruples, though they were fre-
quently at odds on political issues, and at no time had they
been divided by any serious personal dislike. The arrangement
was not unlike that of Pitt and Newcastle (1757-1762) , and the
memories of that highly successful union probably lessened the
hostility of the nation to Fox and North; still neither the
private nor the public life of Fox was of the type to completely

win the confidence of the Snglish nation. The avowed purpose of
their efforts was to curtail the power of George III. When Fox
insisted that the King should not he allowed to be his own
Prime Minister, Lord North, who had done more than any other
one man to "build up personal Royal Governraent
,
replied, "The
Zing ought to be treated with every sort of respect and atten-
tion, but the appearance of power is all that a King of this
1
country can have." In Fox's words, they wished"to give a good,
stout blow to the Grown." North's reasons for Joining the coali"|
tion are rather a puzzle as he had a little while before been
only too glad to get out of office. Perhaps he felt that some
coalition was inevitable, and that Fox and Pitt might form one
which would force him entirely out of the Ministry. Or perhaps
he wished an opportunity to retrieve his reputation; he had not
had a chance to act on his own judgment when he was Prime Mi-
nister before, and he may have felt that he would like a real
opportunity. Nevertheless, the whole business was an unpardon-
able blunder, as no one had condemned North with more vehemence
than had x^ox only a short while before. It certainly seemed to
proclaiTi the determination of two unscrupulous opponents to seal
an artificial union by office obtained by any methods at any
pr ice
.
The King, heartily opposed to the prospect
of the new Government, tried in vain for six weeks to prevent
its formation. He had no love for Shelburne, but he detested Fox;
1 Fox. Correspondence , Vol. II
,
pp. 37-38 , quoted by Blauveult ,p.277

and now had no use for worth because of his "desertion" in
1782. He offered the Treasury to the younger Pitt, who with
admirable discernment saw that his time had not yet come, and
refused it. Pitt said that nothing less than a moral certainty
of a majority in the House of Commons could make him undertake
the task*
There is at least one feature of this
coalition, as it was carried on, which would make it absolutely
impossible today; that was its division on certain issues,
among them that proposed by Pitt for Parliamentary reform.
Pitt described the secret influence as "sapping the very
foundation of liberty by corruption," and he attributed all
the disasters of the American War to the servility of Parlia-
ment. Fox strongly supported the Resolutioni while North op-
posed it; worth of course had to support his own war policy.
The Resolution was rejected by 293 to 149, which is only
Incidental to the fact that even the "broadest-bottomed" of
Cabinets could not exist in our day with such diversity of
opinion among its leaders.
This Administration finally fell be-
cause of tl^ hostility of the Sovereign. He had always treated
its Ministers with cold civility, would make no peers, would
give no assistance, and thought only of the time when he caild
get rid of them; in short, he was profoundly unhappy. Finally
his chance came when the Government brought in a Bill which was
to take India out of the hands of the East India Company and
tiTm mr^r-^tn a hoard of a ftvan nomrn ia aionera i:Q hft nam&d

for the first time by Parliament, and afterward by the Grown.
There was no doubt but that the measure was framed in good faith]
and that it was necessary for humanity, and for the honor of the
country. Regrettable as it was, George III, Pitt, and the East
India Company did not apparently wish to consider the Bill on
its aerits; Fox, not the imperial problem, was made the issue.
The Bill passed the House of Commons by a large majority, and
was on the point of passing the Lords when Lord Temple crept to
the Royal ear and received the message from the King that anyone
in the Lords voting for Fox's Bill "would be considered as a
personal enemy to the Grown;" the result was that it was thrown
out of the Upper House by nineteen votes. The next day the
Ministers were dismissed, and '.Tilliam Pitt, at the age of twen-
ty-four, accepted the invitation to form a Llinistry and defy the
Opposition. There is no doubt but that a Sovereign who says he
will consider anyone his enemy who votes for a measure which he
has allowed his Ministers to introduce without a word of disap-
proval, is acting in a manner that is both grossly unconstitu-
1
tional and grossly treacherous. The success of the Royal ac-
tion leads us to believe that the power of the Grown was not yet
completely extinct; the maintenance of Pitt in office by the
support of the Sovereign, without a Parliamentary majority,
strengthens that belief.
1 Lecky, Vol. IV, p. 330
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II. Cabinet Unity - Supremaoy of the Prime Minister
1770 - 1783
When North came into power in 1770 there
were few changes in the Cabinet; also it contained no men of any
eminence excepting himself. As there is not much that v;e have
not already covered from this point of view, we will not devote
much space to this section of the essay, if we examine the
correspondence between Lord North and the King, we fully realize
how completely the King assumed the position of Prime Minister,
superintending, directing, and prescribing in all its parts the
policy of the Government. Ihe details of military management,
the whole course and character of the war, and sometimes even
the manner in which Government questions were to be argued in
1
Parliament, were controlled by him. The Ministers were now
simply the executive instruments selected by the Sovereign to
carry out nis policy as the forms of law and custom required;
the Ministers, in other words, were merely the servants of the
Crown. Lord Barrington, the Minister of V/ar, is a good example
of this. Though he was supposed to be directly responsible for
the manner in which the war was conducted, as early as 1774 he
informed his colleagues that he disapproved of the whole policy
of coercing the Colonies, and that he believed the military
tactics and enterprises which he organized could lead to nothing
but disaster. In spite of these opinions, he consented at the
1 Lecky. Vol. IIS. p. 76.

I,
request of the King to remain the i*espcnsible Minister until
the end of 1778; meanwhile he ohedi'ently carried out the war
policy of George III* Such a situation did, havever, lead to
concerted action by the Cabinet, even if this action was in
the wrong direction, and there was no serious Cabinet dis-
sension until 1779,
As Lord worth was personally subservient
to the King, with this state of affairs he naturally had a
greater ascendancy in his own Cabinet than most of his pre-
decessors. JNevertheless , we will recall that he steadily repu-
diated the title of Prime Minister.
Rockingham's •dministration was unique in
I
that when it took over the Government in 1782 it marked the I
I first time that there was a complete change in the Cabinet; it
;
was almost complete, at any rate, because the Chancella? was
I
the only Minister to retain his office. The precedent which was
set at that time has been pretty closely follcwed ever since. If
ainy members of the outgoing Cabinet remain in office, it is by
special arrangement with the new Premier. Though all the
Ministers were new and, with one exception, of the Whig party,
they were divided into two factions; half of them were followers
of Rockingham, while the rest were adherents of Shelburne. The
odd man was Thurlow, a trusted friend of the King, of whom we i;
Shall hear more in connection with William Pitt; he was the !|
Chancellor in this Cabinet.
The King was still hostile to the new
v/sa
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Administrat ioQ , and resorted to his tactics of stirring up dis-
sension among its ministers; in this he was aided materially by
Thurlow, who was openly opposed to his Chief, Shelburne did
not help to solidify matters as he made it his main object to
disjoint and pulverize parties, and to govern men chosen from
the most v.irious connections. The only way the coalition hung
together at all until Rockingham's death was by the efforts of
the Prime Llinister himself, ^e and Burke, who was in the Mini-
stry but not in the Cabinet, sought to maintain unity and homo-
geneity in the Government that it might dictate its policy to
the King, and also elaborate carefully the organization of par-
ties. Rockingham did have a particular ability in the matter of
drawing men together in closer harmony. He ai:ned to convert
party connection and personal friendship, which others had ren-
dered subservient only to temporary views and the purpose of
1
ambition, "into a lasting depository of his principles." He
alone could keep the '.7hig party together, and his death brought
divisions in the Cabinet to a head.
When the new Administration was in the
process of formation, Fox correctly pointed oat that it looked
as if it would consist of two parts, "one belonging to the
King, and the other to the public," Consequently, Fox declined
to serve in the new Ministry. His decision was sound as he had
no confidence in the armies, policy, and sincerity of the new
Premier, a title, by the way, which Shelburne repudiated. It
1 Keppel , Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham and his Con-
temporaries, Vol. II, p. 487. Referred to hereafter as Xeppel.
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9surely was his duty to refuse to serve under a leader whom he
thoroughly distrusted. Many of Fox»s friends, among them the
Duke of Portland, Lord John Cavendish, Burke and Grafton,
retired with the leader of their group upon the death of Rock-
ingham. The personality and methods of Shelburne himself did
much to add to the difficulties of the Cabinet, He was artificial,
overstrained, and affectedly obsequious and reserved in his
dealings with his colleagues. Because he did not communicate
the ends of his own which he pursued, his Ministers constantly
suspected him of duplicity, and complained of his failure to
consult them. Everybody quarrelled with the Premier but young
William Pitt, and he later said that he had ^oned for any
errors he might have committed by having served almost a
year under Lord Shelburne, All in all we gather that this
Cabinet was not exactly a unit. We have already seen how it
was forced out by the Pox -worth coalition in 1783, It is
enough to say of this coalition that it was hampered by
surprisingly little friction. Perhaps they were not in office
long enough for any real issue to divide them to a great
extent
,
f

C. 1783-1803
Effect of the Character of the Prime Minister on the Office
As we have only one Administration to deal
with in this period, it seems advantageous to subdivide it
more minutely for the sake of clarity; hence the reader will
here find the sections standing by themselves which in the two
previous periods would have been included in other, more corn"
prehensive topics.
^TOm 1783 until the end of the century
we shall follow the Cabinet policy of the younger William Pitt,
It was he who gathered up the loose ends of the Government
which had been left hanging when the i^ox"Worth coalition was
dismissed, and who finally reestablished the Prime Minister as
a permanent institution, m many ways his Administration was
insignificant, but in this respect it was far reaching.
V/e will remember that Villiam Pitt came
into office after the ^oz-North coalition was defeated on the
iSaat xndia Bill; he was not yet twenty-five years of age. ".'/hen
he died in 1806 he had been at the head of the Government for
a longer period than any other statesman except Walpole ; no
political figure of the first rank, before or since his day,
has spent so brief a political period of his life out of office.
He inherited from his father the gift of oratory and confidence
in his ability to lead; too, he was a great financier. As a
leader of party and as a larliamentary master of the eighteent
ii
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century he is ec[aalled, but not surpassed, by \7alpole alone.
On the other hand, there is probably much truth in what Leoky
Bays of hirn, that his solid ability bore no kind of proportion
1
to his oratorical skill. By his pov^er of debate accompanied
by great decision of character, by the favour of the Zing, an
illustrious name, and a great national power he maintained an
s
-authority immensely greater than his deserts. He had unlimited
ambition and a love of power not exceeded by Walpole, but his
motives v.ere impeccable, even if quarrel with his conclusion^
He dominated Parliament, the Grown, the country, and his Cabinet
"by that sheer force of character which placed him in a lonely
class by himself on the Treasury Branch. Under him the office
of Prime Llinister regained the prestige that had been imparted
to tt by x'alpole, and it became established by the end of the
century as a permanent and unique feature of the English Govern")
ment. This writer cannot but conclude that the development of
the office was largely due to the dominant personalities of
Walpole and the younger Pitt.
9
1 Lecky, Vol.1, p. 392.
2 Robertson, p. 308.
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TT, Relations of the King to Prime Miniater
1783 - 1803
Pitt ultiTiately was supreme over
George III, but he first came into power and maintained office
solely on the strength of support frcm his Sovereign. This is
shown by the fact that although resolutions under Pox's
leadership were passed in the House of Commons which were
hostile to the Ministry, he was not forced to give up office*
Of course this could not keep up indefinitely, but until he was
able to secure a majority in the Lower House he was dependent
upon Royal support. This support was given largely through the
instrument of the House of Lords. The King, who had refused
to create a single peer during the Coalition Government now
publicly marked his sentiments by creating four on the recom-
mendation of his new Prime ?^inldber. By 1801, Ip spite of the
fact that George III had scruples against increasing the
peerage, Pitt had created no less than 140 peers; they were
not for merit of any kind, but in most cases purely for politi-
cal support. This activity was called "recruiting the peerage."
This policy of the King, that is maintaining Pitt in power,
needs no defense, because it was endorsed by the declaration of
the national will; incidentally,^J©.^a5.ned a hold on the affec-
tion of the people such as he had never had before.
Pitt was not a Minister after the King's
own heart as North had been between 1770 and 1778, merely
1•£/d
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content to be guided by the Royal will, but desired to use the
force and resources of the Crown to carry out his ovin policy.
George freed himself from the danjer of ./hig domination, but he
did so at the cost of resigning his hopes of establishing a
personal system of u^overnraent. He never liked Pitt, but knew
that Pitt stood between him and Zox; so for aeventeen years he
was content that he should retain of! ice.
ihere now arose a question as to who
should appoint the Ministers. Pitt's attitude on this problem
is not exactly vihat we .. ould expect in a real xrime Minister,
He questioned the right of the House of Commons to express a
general want of confidence in the Minister without specifying
distinct charges, and maintained that the House of Commons in
condemning the Llinister Just appointed by the Crown (1784)
,
before vv'aiting for these measures, was violating the prerogativ€
of the oovereign to choose hie Minister. Pitt said that if
the Hing coald appoint his Minister the executive power would
1
be transplanted to the House of Commons. V/here is the safety oi
1
any one prerogative of the Crown, or even of the Grown itself.
1
if its prerogative of naming Ministers is usurped by the House
j
of Commons, or if its nomination of them is to be negatived by
1
us without stating any one ground of distrust in the man?
I
It is now generally admitted that Pitt's view was false and
9 dangerous; that the Lower House has a perfect right to withhold
its confidence from Ministers because of the manner in which
1
1 Lecky. Vol. IV, pp. 328,329.
(1
they have "been appointed. Pitt's view may possibly he explain-
ed by the faot that he made the above statement at a time when
he was still under oonsiderable obligation to the King. At any
rate, during the later years of the reign of George III, the
rule became fixed in making up a new Ministry that the King
should simply receive and endorse the list of nominees prepared
and presented by the Premier.
The General Election of 1784, by which
Pitt, as we shall presently see, at last gained a majority in
the House of Commons, was more a victory of the people than of
the King. It was generally thought that the King would be
supreme, but this did not prove to be the case. George could
not overthrow Pitt because he was the only possible Minister,
and as a result Ministerial power was now consolidated; the Mi-
nister and not the King became the true and habitual centre of
authority. V/ith this turn of affairs, the King's Friends were
reduced to submission, and eventually disappeared, because
there was no more need of them; the Departmental system was dea^
as far as lingland was concerned.
Generally speaking, Pitt sought to re-
concile the Crown's prerogative with the functions of Parlia-
ment, but his attitude toward the King was marked by a proud
1
independence, which often caused annoyance. He brought
103
1 Rose, The Life of 7illiam Pitt , Part I, p. 175.
Referred to hereafter as Rose.
Ii
forv^ard measures of the King disapproved, and in all im-
portant matters he had his way until the Spring of 1801, when
George demurred on conscientious grounds, ihe note of affec-
tionate intimacy which marke/3 the lioyal intercourse with IJorth
and Addington (1803) was absent, but its place was taken by a
growing confidence upon the part of George for his Prime Mi-
nister, which gradually deepened into genuine admiration. Al-
though Pitt insisted upon having the controlling voice in
matters of importance, by reason of his early dependence upon
the Crown he naturally leaned toward prerogative and Tory
principles of Government. So if George III was no longer his
own Minister he had the satisfaction of seeing his own prin-
1
ciples carried out by hands far abler than his own.
Pitt, then, did not attempt to reduce the Grown to a
cipher, and George was allowed to exercise a strong and legiti-
mate influence on politics as an adviser of the Cabinet .Another
way of looking at the relationship between the Grown and litt
is suggested by liose, George III showed marked ability in the
support of corporate interests and the management of men, so
that his relations to Pitt were not unlike those of the Duke
of Newcastle to Chatham. The Pitts supplied the brain power,
while the Monarch or the Duke, by the award of favors, ensured
the needful degree of subservience at the polls, or in the
1 I.lay , The Constitutional History of England Since the Ac-
cession" of George III, Yol. i, p. 82.
~
Referred to hereafter as May.
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lobbies of ot. Stephens. i'rom the foregoing points and
analogies it is clear that we are still a long viay from the
Cabinet of the nineteenth century and its conventions and
customs with regard to the place and functions of a Consti-
tutional Grown; in other words, the I^ing in 1784 still retains
an astonishing amount of power, if we compare him with the
Sovereign of today.
Me now come to an event which is of
particular importance in the relations of Pitt to his Sove-
reign, as it vTas the cauee of his resignation in 1801; we re-
fer to the Irish question. The rebellion of 1798 in Ireland
convinced Pitt as he had thought from 1785, that a legislative
union between ^leat Britain and Ireland was inevitable. Also
he wished -;oman Catholic emancipation, the commutation of the
tit]ae, *if»4> the provision of endowment for the Catholic Priest-
hood and Dissenters, and free trade between the two countries.
The provision which he proposed of the most significance to
us, however, was that there should be a political, instead of
a sacramental test for office^ by which Itoman Catholics would
be able to enter the Legislature and hold offices at present
2
locked against them by "the symbols of atoning grace."
In other words, in place of the ^ath of Supremacy and Abjura-
tion, he desired to impose oh members of Parliament and other
officials merely the Oath of Allegiance, which would be no bar
1 Rose, Part II, pp. 561,562.
2 Robertson, p. 404.
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to Roman Catholics. He got the Act of Union through the English
Houses without much trouble 3ji 1799, and through the Irish
Legislature by wholesale bribery. Pitt had reason to believe
that the King would not oppose him on the Cathialic question,
because Ireland had of late been fairly peaceful; furthermore,
the position of England was at that time desperate as Russia
was ready to attack her upon a moment's notice, and France was
now reunited; also there was discontent at home, waturally
George would not relish a change in Government at such a crisis!
The Union safely accomplished, Pitt in
September of 1800 brought the Catholic question formal"^ y be-
fore his colleagues, x^ow the Lord Chancellor, Lord Lotpghborough}
for the first time struck a discordant note, objecting to any
favour being granted to the Catholics except a commutation cf
titles. George III was sincerely religious in his own narrow
way and he believed that if he assented to Roman Catholic
relief it would be a direct violation of the Coronation Oath,
by which he was supposed to be the protector of the Established
Church. Loughborough, aware of this conviction of the King,
betrayed to him the message of the Prime Minister, which had
been delivered to the Cabinet in the strictest confidence.
His secret counsels may not have had a profound effect upon
George, because a collisjbn between Pitt and the King on this
topic was certainly inevitable; without doubt, however, it put
an edge on the King's resolve to make the matter an issue. At
any rate the Sovereign now termed the measure the most
Bfr err
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JaoolDinical thing he had ever heard of, and declared that he
would make any man who proposed such a measure his personal
enemy. This statement had a profouhd effect upon the Cabinet,
as the Duke of Portland, Lord Liverpool, and even Lord Chat-
ham, the "brother of Pitt, now swayed toward the opposition,
and left Pitt in a far less powerful position than he might
have enjoyed with a united Cabinet. Upon the reiteration of
this stand taken "by the King, the Cabinet now definitely went
over to hi:n^ and Pitt could only tender his resignation, which
had been requested.
Pitt has been charged with playing a
selfishly criminal game in resigning, with the evident intent
of showing his own strength and being called back into office
on his own terms. This is absurd; according to Grenville :
"There was no alternative except that of taking this step ...
or of agreeing to the-der eliction of one's opinion on one of
the most important questions in the whole range of our doraes-
i
tic policy." The writer is inclined to agree with him. There
are, as a matter of fact, other opinions as to why Pitt re-
signed. Because of the nature of the promises made to the
Catholics, he deemed himself bound to carry them out or to re-
sign if he could not. The cause with which we are most concerned
is Pitt's reason for resigning. He saw it his honour and duty^
as well as that of his colleagues, to decline to continue in
1 Rose, Part 3, pp. 445, 446
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office when they were not allowed to propose with the authority
of the Government a measure which they considered the proper
seq.uel of the Union.
The Irish question proves that the King, even in
1801, was far from "being a nonentity in the Government. He
gained a further triumph after the resignation of Pitt, when,
during an attack of lunacy he succeeded in exacting a promise
from Pitt never to agitate the question of Catholic i:imancipa-
I
tion during the remainder of his reign. No incident in the
life of Pitt is more unfortunate than this. It is said that
he yielded because he was overcome "by emotion at the mental
' agitation of the Monarch; this is not consistent with any of
his former relations with the King, which had always been cold
and formal. The real reason probably is that he was at almost
all times, as we shall see, prepared to give up measures for
the sake of power. Once again then did George III defeat the
policy of his Ministers and drive them from office. He en-
joyed a five-fold triumph without concessions that hurt his
principles; he got the Union; he drove Pitt, when he resisted,
from office; he exacted a pledge from the two leading states-
1
men of the day; he outlived both Pitt and Fox; and he did
not go pernanently mad until he had inoculated his son and suc-
cessor with his own bigotry.
1 Pox also agreed not to raise the question of Catholic
iiJmancipation.

It seems certain that Pitt might well have de-
feated the King on this issue. Lord Malraestury said, "If Pitt
had "been provident enough to prepare the King's mind gradually,
and to prove to him that the test proposed was as binding as
the present oath, no difficulty could have arisen." Or if,
as Pitt had desired, no communication had been made to the
King until the Catholic Emancipation, with its accompanying de-
tails, could have been presented to George III as the unani-
mous and deliberate policy of his Cabinet, there is little
doubt that he must have yielded. It was utterly impossible in
the existing state of Sngland , of the Continent, and of Parlia-
ment, that any Llinistry could have subsisted to which he was
seriously opposed. If he had per severed, he must have triumphed
I
and the King must have submitted. At any rate it was Pitt's
plain duty to persevere. The political importance of his
decision was tremendous, as the success of the Union and the
future lo^, alty of the Catholics of Ireland depended mainly
upon his conduct.
A new Ministry was formed by the Speaker,
Henry Addingtoa, who was thoroughly congenial to the King; but
it was admittedly weak in personnel and experience. At length,
public opinion insisted that the war required the immediate
return of Pitt to the Prime Ministership. Upon the recovery
of the King from a brief mental collapse. Parliamentary attack
1 Lecky, Yol.TZfil , p. 51
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pressed and the Government majority sank rapidly. Finally
Addington resigned and Pitt was somewhat reluctantly invited
by the King to f cxrra a new Ministry. This Administration is of
no importance to us except to reveal that the King still had
a say in who should be admitted to the Cabinet. Pitt urged the
formation of a united Ministry which would include both Fox
and Grenville; George accepted the latter, but drew the line
on Fox. The Cabinet, therefore, had to be patched up out of
the Addington group, as Grenville would not serve without Fox,
and the remaiants of Pitt*s party. It was a weak Cabinet, due
solely to the obstinacy of George Itl. Pitt was not the Pitt of
1793 and he died in eighteen months, broken in health.

III. Prirae Minister's Helatioa to House of Commons
1783 - 1800
V/hen Pitt came to power in 1783, the opposition com-
manded so large a majority in the House of Commons that it
was generally supposed that the first action of the Ministers
would "be to dissolve Parliament and call for a new election.
At any rate, if the Kinistry did not choose to have a new
election, it was surely the place of the opposition to do so.
Fox should have placed on record, as its leader, the solemn
protest of the House at the dangerous and unconstitutional
action of the Crown, and then have given the new Prime Mini-
ster a fair chance; Foz could then, if the expected dissolu-
tion were not forthcoming, have proved that Pitt cared more
for principles than for office. But instead of that logical
policy, he showed that dissolution was the one thing he feared,
and a return to office the one thing he desired. He forgot
that the final verdict lay not with the Commons, nor with the
1
Crown, but with the electors and public opinion. Fox's rea-
son for not seeking a dissolution was that a measure of trans-
cendent importance, which was supported by the great majority
of the House of Commons, had been suddenly arrested by a
2
"grossly unconstitutional interference of the sovereign",
and there was, therefore, no adequate reason for appealing to
the Constituencies.
1 Robertson, p. 303.
2 Lecky,. Vol. IV, p. 320.
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It was entirely without precedent
for the King to keep his Ministers in offioe in defiance of the
repeated Hesolutions which were now made 1d^/ the Lower House.
It would seem that there was absolutely no Constitutional basis
for Pitt's retention of power now, except that the coalition
had been defeated on that one bill, coocerning the Jiast India
Company. The Coalition Ministers still commanded an overwhelm-
ing majority in the House of Commons. The Bill had been defeat-
ed in the Upper House, where there was a large section subservi-
ent to the 2:ing, and as the deciding vote was only 9E to 76, it
seems reasonable to suppose that with the King's assistance the
Bill might have been easily passed in that Chamber. The only
thing which prevented the policy of the Government from doing
itself any harm was the attitude of the opposition, as des-
cribed by Fox, Hose justifies Pitt's retention of the Prime Mi-
nistership by saying that the prerogatives of Parliament are su"!
servient to the iaterests of the nation, and when the majority
of the House of Commons acts in a way strongly reprobated by
1
public opinion, its authority undergoes an immediate eclipse.
This does not, however, justify in any \^ay Pitt's failure to
call a new election, if we consider the question solely upon
Constitutional grounds, because it was the duty of Pitt, if
he thought the Lov;er House was not truly representative, to
call for an election that would make it such. Pitt's own reason
for his action, or lack of action, is interesting. "The immediate
1 Hose. Part I, p. 150.
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appointment or removal of ministers does not rest with this
House. There is, therefore, nothing illegal in a minister's
remaining in office after this House has declared against him,
particularly when immediate resignation would have injured the
1
country." Pitt later modified this statement considerahly by
saying that no Ministry, which did not posess the confidence of
the House of Gommons, could last,
Pitt, cognizant of the fact that he could not remain
in office indefinitely upon this unstable foundation, deter-
mined to do battle in the Lovver House in the hope that he would
overcome the majority, discredit his enemies, and win the con-
fidence of the country before he appealed to it. This was sure-
ly a unique method of procedure, if we compare it to the accept-
ed customs of today, but it seems justified, on the whole, and
at any rate proved highly successful, Pitt broadened the issue
at stake into one which raised the rights and place of the Grown
in Government. He claimed to be the champion of a sane Toryism
against a coalition of renegade V/higs under Worth, and factious
Radicals under J'ox, The hostile majority gradually melted away,
and the election of Uarch 1784 developed into a rout for Pitt.
The people voted not for the King's system as he understood it,
but for Pitt against Fox, and also for what they thought were
2
Pitt's principles, and the use he would make of supremacy.
Incidentally, all that made the Grown worth wearing was at
113
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stake for George III. If j'ox's party had obtained a majority
at the national election, George for the rest of his life would
I
have hecome a mere puppet in their hands. He won the game, but
he did not win all that he had hoped for.
The majority Pitt secured in the elec-
tion of 1784, in spite of the defects and limitations of the
franchise, proved conclusively that Pitt's power rested on the
1
will of the nation, as had his father's in 1756. He was popu-
lar for many reasons; he was looked upon by the Tories as the
favored Minister of the King and the Defender of prerogative;
to the Whigs he was the champion of reform; his private charac-
ter was stainless; he had no connection with the American V/ar
;
, and he was the son of the great Chatham. He continued as the
Minister of the people until 1790; but although in that year
the General 31ection increased his already large majority, his
popularity soon began to wane because of his high-handed policy
at home. In 1794 the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended, and in
1795 the Treasonable Practices Act was passed. The result of
this was that for the rest of his Administration Pitt had to
govern as the King's Minister and not as the Minister of the
people.
As we have intimated above, Pitt loved
power so much that he gave up principles on more than one oc-
casion rather than relinquish that power. The first indication
we have of this is the Parliamentary Reform Bill of 1785, by
which Pitt had hoped to reform the rotten boroughs, extend the
1 See p. 114A
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This statement must "be discounted to a large extent,
Robertson, in the Appendix to England under the Hanover iana
says that the General Sleotion of 1784 was eifceedingly cor-
rupt. With this in mind, it is evident that Pitt was not
elected any more by the people than were any of the previous
Prime ministers.

franchise, and conpensate the extinguised vested interests with
public money. Although the King finally granted him permission
to have the Bill discussed in the House of Commons, that Body I
refused by a vote of 284 to 174 to grant it a second reading*
Pitt had promised the King he wculd not resign if the Bill were
rejected unless those connected with the Government voted against
it; thus he gave up his ideal, while his authority was in no
way affected.
Another reform which the Prime Minister
wished to put through was the abolition of the slave trade in
1788. He abandoned this, as he had the earlier Bill, when he
found that a divided ma;Jority in both the Cabinet and the Hoxjse
of Lords, a wavering majority in the House of Commons, and the
King were unchangeably opposed to immediate abolition.
The occasion which most clearly brings
out Pitt's tenacity of office was the war with France in 1792,
which upon the death of Louis XVI was seen to be inevitable^
it was demanded in unison by the voices of the Court, aristocrad^
and populace. The Prime Minister had always been unalterably
opposed to war, and without doubt felt that he was doing wrong
in plunging the country into one, the ruiflous consequences of
which he clearly foresaw. At any rate he did not resign his
office. It may be said, as it was of Walpole, that he felt he
could handle the situation better than any one else, in spite of
the fact that he did not believe in it. Brougham, Smith and
Lecky, however, to cite a few, deemed his policy on this occasiob
OV:
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as being at least as bad as that of Lord North, because he at-
tempted to guide the destinies of a warring nation , though he
disapproved of that v^ax
.
Our oonclusions are, then, that the abandonment of
Parliamentary Reform, of the Slave Trade proposition, of the
Catholic Emancipation, and the carrying on of a war to which he
iras opposed, show in impressive fashion Pitt's love of power.
They are ideas abandoned at the first sign of difficulty or
unpopularity, and deliberately sacrificed whenever they appeared
likely to weaken or embarass the Liinistry. The fact that Pitt
was able to maintain office in spite of these setbacks also is
conclusive evidence that the doctrine of Ministerial responsi-
bility, whether collective or personal, had not been definite-
ly established. In fairness to Pitt, it should be brought out
that the chief work of the Cabinet of the eighteenth century
was to govern, and not to pass new laws. Par on in the nezt
century the main business of a Cabinet came to be the proposing
and carrying through of new measures, but this idea had not
1
firmly taken root, surely, in Pitt's day. i^his would help to
justify his giving up of legislation, but it only serves to
further condemn him for staying in office after 1792. At any
rate, connection and influence had not yet wholly given way to
a system of parties founded on general agreement on political
questions, and iuinisterial responsibility to -farliament had not
yet been firmly established.
1 Rose, Part I, p. 205.
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IV. Prime Minister and Party
1783 - 1800
There is not a great deal to say about Pitt's rela-
tion to party, but neither can we ignore this topic altogether.
His first ten years have often been called his Whig period,
which precedes his desertion from Liberalism, or his conversion
to a reactionary Toryism in 1793. It was really not a desertion
but an intelligible evolution. His premiership emphasizes a
double departure; the recreation of the Tory party, and the slow
evolution of a new Whiggism, through puzzling and halting phases
into ©odern Liberalism. His policy, then, firmly brought out
the two party system, as it set the battle array between himself
and the opposition on strict and definable party lines, not be-
cause he had stolen their measures, but because both his princi-
ples and objects, if successfully realized, involved the defeat
1
of '.Vhiggism.
Although Pitt had this effect upon party,
he did not as Prime Iviinister, lead a party of his own in Parlia-
ment until 1792. In 1788 those who recognized him as their
leader in the House of Commons numbered only 52, while Fox's
party, the regular opposition, was estimated at 138. The
"Crown Party", which might be reckoned upon to uphold the Go-
vernment for the time being under any Minister not particular-
ly unpopular, consisted of 185. "iVe do not mean that these were
1 Robertson, p. 309.
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'King's ^^r lends" in any sense of the term, "but that they were an
independent party who deserted Pitt on occasion, as we have
1
seen; in other words, Pitt had yet to bind his party together.
The majority voted every man as he had a mind. His power did
not rest on a solid political phalanx, but v;ould continue only
so long as he fitly interpreted national feeling. This, does
it not, begins to approach the modern position of the Prime
Minister with regard to party, despite the fact that Pitt was
the head of no ei^act party.
Pitt realized the instability of his
party support, and to offset it, attempted to form a working
alliance with the old V/higs
;
negotiations were begun in Hay
1792. The King freely admitted that the "National Aristocracy"
of the country must have its due weight and power, but when he
found that the Coalition Cabinet was to include his hated
enemy, ^ox, he refused to consider the matter further. Later
in 1792, Pitt, according to I-iay, had all the support he wished,
at least among the conservative element. i^ever before had a
Minister been so absolute since England became a Constitution-
al State, governed by the instrumentality of parties; the
clergy, since the Revolutions abroad threatened religion,
were with the Government; the laws and institutions of the
country were believed to be in danger, so the lawyers pressed
forward to the support of Pitt; property and public credit were
menaced, so he was backed by the capitalists and the proprietors
1 Pitt's defeat on the i^eform Bill and on the slavery issue
are examples of such desertions by the "Crown Party."
II
I
I
I
I
i
I
i
I
(
(
1
,1
'j
I
i
119
of the soil. In other words, the elements which made up the
Tory party now recognized Pitt as the leader of that party for
the first time. Now he was Prime Minister in the sense that
he led the controlling party in the House of Commons. By 1794
he commanded such an overwhelming majority that the opposition
could not even amend, much less reject, a single method or
measure upon which the Government insisted.
1 May, Vol. II, p. 47.
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^ Cabinet Unity - Supremacy of the Prime Minister
1785 - 1800
Pitt»s Ministry of 1783 was scarcely
less a coalition than the preceding one which had over-
thrown and covered with opprobrium for their supposed sacrifice
of principle and inconsistency. He had himself contended with
Lord North, yet his Government was composed of friends and
associates of that Minister, and of Whigs who had recently
agreed with North and Fox, The reason for such a broad coalition
tie
was^ weakness of the party of the Prime Minister; the Cabinet
must embrace as many factions of the House of Commons as pos-
sible, to enable it to control a majority by a sort of bloc,
Pitt for seventeen years was an even
more absolute Prime Minister than Walpole had been, maintain-
ing supreme control over his colleagues. He did permit to a
culpable extent open questions among the men in office, but he
was too strong a chief to tolerate the old system of a divided
Cabinet, He was always as reserved with his colleagues as he
was with the King, As Robertson says, he was like a power
living apart in an austere atmosphere of his own; his person-
jality was something to be felt. Like Walpole, he showed very
little disposition to ally himself with any of those shining
lights which might imperil his ascendancy^ but sought rather
to surround himself with men of sound judgment and great
business capacity who could never rise into competition

121
with him. From these men, who were not comparable to him in
ability, he exacted obedience, not counsel; in this he was re-
miniscent of his father. His commanding temper, moreover, would
never have brooked the superior airs of Temple and Shelburne,
which Chatham was compelled to endure. Due to the mediocrity
of his colleagues he could, from the outset, carry out his plan
of moulding the Cabinet to his will.
His only stumbling block in the Cabinet was Thurlow.
Lord Thrulow was the Chancellor in Pitt's Cabinet, and was a
particular friend of the ^iag; his dismissal in 1792 is simply
a concrete example of what we have been saying concerning Pitt's
authority in the Cabinet. This man was often an effective lead-
er of the opposition in the Cabinet, but Pitt had to put up
with him for some time because of his power in the House of
Lords. He has been described as a man with the Roman Conquest
[in his eyebrow, and the Feudal System in every feature of his
face. Hose says of him that at least the boom of his voice was
Z
I worth something to an otherwise weak Ministry. In spite of
I
this undeniable asset, Pitt found him a colleague wholly fruit-
ful in Council, and one always apt to raise difficulties; this
j last characteristic led to his being termed "that enemy of all
human action."
Thurlow hoped to retain in the Ministry of Pitt the posi
tion of the Zing's confidential Minister which he had previously
held. A mischievous tradition had of late years been
1 Lecky, Vol. V,f).2^.
2 nose. ?6Ltt. I. p .
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arising that the Chancellor, though a member of the Cabinet
|
and entrusted with Cabinet secrets, had a right to pursue in
politics an independent, and even a hostile course • In accordance
with this tradition, when Pitt instituted a system for the
reduction of the Debt by providing that every new loan should
carry a sinking fund of its own, Thurlow poured ridicule upon
it in the House of Lords, and spoke of its author with con-
tempt. He also, at this time, opposed in the House of Lords,
Fox's Libel Bill, which had been supported by Pitt. The latter,
who had borne long enough Thurlow »s swollen temper and constant
opposition ^ now told the King plainly that he must choose between
him and the Chancellor. George unhesitatingly demanded Thurlow »s
resignation, and that gentleman retired at the end of the
session. Lord Loughborough taking his place. Pitt's ascendancy
in the Cabinet was now placed beyond dispute. The dismissal of
TlDurlow marks a step forward in the development of the Cabinet
System; it was now no longer possible, as it had been in the
earlier years of the reign, for a Minister to remain in office,
through the King's favour, against the will of the Prime
Minister. When a Prime Minister is dissatisfied with one of
his colleagues he may insist upon his resignation, for if he
requests the dismissal, his request cannot be rejected unless
the Sovereign is prepared to form a new Ministry. Thus the
authority of the Prime Minister becamVj^e more clearly defined;
his supremacy in the Cabinet, and the principles of collective
agreement on fundamental political issues www enforced by this
ir^l f-
-SJrf'x'
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salut*j?y lesson. It was simply a reiteration of Walpole's
policy. The Cabinet was now a well disciplined Council, obeying
the impulsion of the First Minister, and adding force to
his declaration of policy.

YI. Pitt's GoDtribution to the Office of Prime liinister
1785 ~ 1800
Pitt is considered a great iinglish statesman and
Prime Minister, but there is no gainsaying the fact that he did
not contribute much in the way of constructive legislation to
Great Britain's Government, He died in the bitter knowledge
that popular liberties had been suspended (as a result of his
stern war measures) , that the National Debt had been more than
doubled, taxation strained to the breaking point, a q^uarter of
a million human lives sacrificed, and that peace and reform were
1
further out of sight than ever, tVith his great power, except
for the Union of Ireland, which was more or less forced up0n
him by a rebellion, he did not leave a single measure behind him
for which the community, whose doctrines he so long swayed, has
2
any reason to respect his memory. This seems like rather a
strong statement, but there is doubtless much truth in it.
But if Pitt did not accomplish much in
the way of concrete constructive measures, his contribution to
the office of Prime Liinister is of the utmost importance. The
growth of the powers of the Cabinet, which had been interrupted
since the fall of V/alpole, now proceeded normally. During the
seventeen years of Pitt's supremacy, the principle became fair-
ly established that the Chief Minister of the Crown was the
1 Hol^ertson, p. 308.
2 Brougham (Essay on William Pitt), Vol. I, p. 279.

centre of authority, and that, while holding that authority
nominally from the King, he exercised it hy virtue of a mandate
from the people. He lea the Government in the Representative
Chamber, which, like V/alpole, Peel and Gladstone, but unlike
Chatham and Beaeonsf ield , he steadily refused to leave. He was
the mainspring of Governmental action, and formed a system and
tradition of Government which could never be destroyed. In
short, the position of Prime Minister was now definitely esta-
blished .
Rose's comparison of Pitt to Robert V/alpole is worthy
of note. Pitt was far more than a second Walpole. Walpole
wielded power as a nominee of the V/hig Houses. Pitt was esta-
blished in office by a wider and grander mandate. The General
Election of 1784 ended the existing party system and shattered
the rule of the Great V/hig families who had hitherto dominated
the Georgian iilra. "The somnolent acquiescence of the populace
in that headship now gave way to a more critical spirit, to a
sense that the traditional parties must readjust themselves
1
under a new leader." The Election of 1784 eventually result-
ed in the emergence of a party which may be termed National.
The need of a Prime Minister in the
Cabinet, and to lead the Government, was certainly not felt in
1783. The Duke of Grafton's statement to Shelburne, when
asked to join his L^inistry in 1787, saying that he would not
1 Rose, Part i, p. 177.
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consider Shelburne Prime l»linister but only as holding the prin-
cipal place in the Cabinet, is an indication of this fact.
Grafton further declared, when the Uuke of Rutland succeeded to
a place in the Cabinet, that Shelburne had no right to make an
addition to the Cabinet without consulting its members; he was
making himself a "Prime Minister" by so doing. He was so
wrathy at such a detestable situation that he resigned his of-
fice of Privy Seal. The fact that Fox and North later shared
practical control of affairs, while the Duke of Portland suc-
ceeded to the Treasury, would also lead us to believe that the
office of Prime Minister was not regarded as essential in 1783.
Sven twenty years later the same opinion was abroad, although
to a much lesser extent. In 1803 Addington proposed a coalitio
with Pitt upon essentially the same basis which had existed v;it
the ^'ox-IJorth combination. The idea was that they should both
be Secretaries of State, with a First Lord of the Treasury of
no political importance, and that there should be no Prime
Minister. Pitt's reaction proves conclusively his conception
of the office. His view is stated in the letter of Lord I.lel-
ville to Addington, It is an absolute necessity "in the conduct
of the affairs of this country, that there should be an avowed
and real minister, possessing the chief weight in the council,
and the principal place in the confidence of the king. In that
respect there can be no rivalry or division of power. That power
must rest in the person generally called the First Minister, and
ihe
that minister ought, he thinks, to be the person at the head of
1—1
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finances But still, if it should come unfortunately to
such a radical difference of opinion that no spirit of concili
ation or concession can reconcile, the sentiments of the mini-
ster must be allowed and understood to prevail, leaving the
other members of administration to act as they may conceive
themselves conscientiously called upon to act under tjae circum
1
stances.
"
Morley, pp. 162,163.
Morley quotes from Stanhoi Life of Pitt, iv, 24.

I General Conception of Prime Minister Today
It was Pitt's long Ministry, the
clearness with which he recognized his position, the absence
froDi his Cabinet of any rival in intellectual ability, the
tact with which he determined relations with the Eing, and , it
must be added, the national centralization which came with a
time of war — all these together — which brought the modern
office of Prime Minister finally into existence. V»'hen the
Cabinet must follow the Prime Minister as a unit, and when the
King can no longer interfere with the policy of the Prime
Minister who holds a position independent of him, the modern
I
system is in operation.
The Cabinet is now virtually a com-
mittee of the party which for the time has a majority in the
Legislature, and the members of the committee who represent tha";
party hold homogeneous views on the important issues of the pol:.
tics of the day. So long as they command the support of a major'
•ity of the representative chamber, as expressed in its votes, or
by the results of a General Election, they will continue to
1 Adams^p. 429.

hold office until their tenn is up. The Cabinets of today are
usually selected from one party, although there have been
coalitions of men of opposite parties. As a matter of fact the
Cabinet of 1933 is a Coalition Cabinet, but it is presumably
temporary. Pitt's Cabinet we may consider as representative of
an Independent Party, rather than a strictly Tory group. The
Prime Minister of today, as the leader of the party in power
in the House of Commons, is the leader of the House itself.
There is no doubt but what Pitt was the leader of the Lower
House. When the Prime Minister finds he is not the leader of
the House of Commons, or cannot command a majority there be-
cause his party has deserted him, or because it has lost its
majority in the representative chamber, he is duty bound to
resign his office. Pitt never found himself in this position,
but there is ample evidence throughout the century that these
doctrines had become an accepted part of Parliamentary Govern-
ment long before 1800. So we have traced the evolution of
Cabinet responsibility to Parliament,
The head of the C*inet today is the
Prime Minister, who is selected by the Crown, but who with
its approval selects his colleagues. This custom was not
definitely established until Peel's appointment to office in
1834. We have seen, however, how both Walpole and Pitt gained
Ministers whom they desired after they became firmly entrenched
in office. Pitt would not stand for Thurlow, and insisted upon
having in his place Lord Loughborough, who, he thought, would
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b© of service to him, weither Pitt nor Walpole wgui in a strong
enough position to demand the right of appointing their own
Ministers when they first accepted office, because of their
dependence upon Royal influence.
In the case of differences arising be-
tween the Departments it is to the Prime Minister that appeal
lies, and the regular course for a Minister who is dissatisfied
with his chief's decision is to retire. When a Prime Minister
wiehaa a Minister's resignation he must first go to the
Sovereign to procure assent; but that assent could never be
refused to a Prime Minister with a Parliamentary majority, un-
less the Sovereign were prepared to take new Ministers and
face a dissolution. Here we again cite the Thurlow dismissal;
that was exactly the plan of action taken by Pitt, The King
was given his choice, and he chose Pitt* In other words
individual Ministerial responsibility is by 1800 an accepted
part of Cabinet proceedure.
The power of the Prime Minister has been
enhanced by the extension of the franchise. He has become
more the direct choice of the people as the House of Commons
has become more and more the reflection of popular opinion.
The majority which supports a Minister in the House of Commons
now is very different from that which supported him in the
eighteenth century; he then, in the last resort, could appeal
only to nomination boroughs and close corporations. The power
of the modem Prime Minister is not inferior to that of a
1i
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Dictator, provided that the House of Oommons will stand by him.
Ordinarily he leaves the heads of Departments to do their work
in their own way. Ministers on important "business always call
him into Qouncil. Foreign affairs must alv.ays be the matter of
continuous thought in the mind of the Prime Minister, although
they are not continuously before the Cabinet. Applying this
definition to '^Tilliam Pitt, we must admit that he came pretty
close to being a Prime Minister in the modern sense of the term.
J?'rom 1792 on, by dint of his autocratic war measures at home,
he was practically Dictator. How much departmental business he
actually left to his colleagues we do not know, but we do know
that he had efficient, if not brilliant, subordinates. Perhaps
it is not assuming too much to say that he allowed them a cer~
tain amount of authority in their respective fields. It is
certain that his hand guided the diplomatic relations of Great
Britain at this time. .Ve will remember that it was he v.ho or-
ganized the coalitions against France until he broke under the
terrific strain in 1806.
The custom is now, and was by 1800, secure that the
Soverei^ti through his authorized agents will govern in accord-
ance with the law and with the national will. Such attempts to
intrigue the Sovereign against a colleague as were common with
Carteret and Townshend, and as were afterward repeated with par-
ticular baseness by Lord Loughborough, when he secretly warned
George III of Pitt's Catholic policy, are, we may be very con-
fident, never likely to recur.
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Although it may be unnecessary, we again feel com-
pelled to remind the reader that the Cabinet and its Chief are
the outstanding features of a Government based not on statute
law, but on custom, convention, and convenience, whose raison
d '^tre is to harmonize the exercise of the Royal prerogative of
the Grown with the broad principle of llinisterial responsibility
and with the powers and rights of a representative Legislature.
It is possible that within the next hundred years
government by Parliament may undergo changes of substance as
important as the changes since Sir Robert V/alpole ; but it is
worthy of remark that living statesmen of evident experience
i'
and highest authority in the working of the English Constitu-
;|
II
tional system have declared that in their judgment the Cabinet, I!
as a great organ of Government, has now found its final shape,
1
attributes, function, and permanent ordering.
9
1 Morley, p. 165.
i'I
4
j
\
i
\
I
;
]
i
Summary
The thesis is concerned with three periods: the
first is from 1700 to 1770, the second from 1770 to 1783, and
the third from 1763 to 1803. During the reign of Queen Anne,
and from 1714 to 1721, there was no real Cabinet unity, al"
though the office of Prime Minister was even then recognized
hy a few people of discernment in government circles.
The office of Prime Linister arose because of ne-
cessity; that is to say, the absence of the King from the meet-
ings of the Cabinet made it imperative that there be a real
leader in the Cabinet. Also, the long rule of the '.Vhigs which
now ensued, helped to weaken the Grown. This weakening natur-
ally left the Prime Minister in a strong position.
Walpole is generally regarded as the first Prime
Minister, although there were a few so-called Prime Ministers
before him. de had considerable power before 1721, the date
of the beginning of his administration. Officially, he became
the ?irst Lord of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer.
For a time, George I had the power of choosing his
own Prime Ministers, but when Walpole came in, the 2ing was
soon forced to assume an unimportant place in the government.
George II was likewise rendered subservient to Walpole. He was
forced to accept Walpole as Prime Minister in 1727, and did not
11
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have the power of appointing his own Ca^binet. Walpole strengthen'
ed his position hy cultivating Hoyal favor.
Carteret, V/alpole's successor, relied solely upon the
Crown for his support and was forced to resign after a short
administration.
It is a significant feature in the decline of royal
power, that the Sing did not choose the Prime Minister in 1754.
William Pitt, the i^arl of Chatham, became Prime Mi-
nister on his own terms in 1756, However, in 1757, George II
was at least consulted in the selection of Cabinet members.
Between 1757 and 1760 George II was a nonentity in the govern-
ment .
Under George III there was a definite effort to re-
store the power of the Crown by the Departmental system of go-
vernment, for George III considerea the Xing, and not the Prime
Minister the real leader of the government. To be sure, he de-
sired power for vYhat he considered legitimate reasons. In 1761
George III favored Bute, rather than Pitt, and the latter was
eventually forced to resign. Bute's character was not the type
from which Prime Ministers are made, however, Pox's bribery
of the House of Commons is significant, because it marks the
beginning of George Ill's attempt to gain power. Bute prepared
the way for the king's system. Grenville was given office be-
cause he was believed to be subservient to the King. Neverthe-
less, he had ideas of his own, and was disposed to be no mere
puppet to the Sing. Consequently, he soon lost the sovereign's
suT)iPort. and was forced to resign.
Ii
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George III had greatly increased his authority be-
tween 1760 and 1765, largely by means of the "King's Friends",
Pitt's refusal to ally himself with Rookingham forther streng-
thened the position of the '^ing. ^Mevertheless
,
ieorge III was
forced to accept an objectionable Cabinet under Rockingham in
1765. The monarch received an additional boost in 1767 because
of Chatham's disjoi^^ad Cabinet. ^eorge Ill's rise continued
under the administration of Grafton who resigned from office
in 1770 because of the lack of support from the Crown.
Walpole chose to rule by Parliamentary support, but
he also saw the Cabinet as being closely related to the Lower
House, rie recognized the importance of the House of Commons,
and used corruption to secure its support. He believed that
the Prime Minister should lead the House of Commons. He gave
heed to public opinion on the Excise Tax, but did not resign
from office. He also failed to resigh during the war question
of 1739, although by that time he had lost public opinion. He
finally resigned in 1742 when he perceived that he had lost
the support of the Lower House. His influence upon the office
of Prime Minister was undoubtedly greater than that of any
other man.
Nobody wanted a Prime Llinister in 1742, but Carteret
attempted to fill that position. He lacked a majority in the
House of Commons, and this was the principal cause of his
early fall from power.
The affair of 1746, during the Pelham administration.
c:
-
proved the power of a united Ministry supported by the House of
Coomons, Pelham succeeded in keeping the opposition powerless
"by the use of hrihes, even as rValpole had done.
i-Jewcastle was forced to resign in 1756 because he was
not the actual leader of the House of Commons. Pitt (Chatham)
"became Prime Minister in 1757, largely because of his popularity
although he was not the leader of the House of Gonimons. He was
dismissed because he could not command a majority in that Cham-
ber, in 1757, and to regain his power, was forced to make an
alliance with iJewcastle. In 1758 Pitt maintained supremacy in
Parliament by taking any powerful opponents into the cabinet.
However, the Sing and Bute gained control of Parliament.
Bute was not the real leader of the House of Commons,
and was terrifically unpopular with the people. Consequently
his early dismissal was inevitable.
The Hockingham Llinistry was seriously weakened because
of the refusal of Pitt to join it. His iiifluence in the House
of Commons would have made the Cabinet invincible.
Chatham lost much of his popularity when he accepted
a peerage in 1766. He was not really Prime Linister, however,
because he refused to rely upon party, xhat G-eorge Ill's
power was at this time fairly well established, is evinced by
his manipulation of the House of Commons.
Grafton's resignation was partly caused because of
his lack of influence in the Lower House.
Burke's views on party and his conception of Chatham's
attitude on party are enlighteniag to the student.
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By 1770, due to the immense corruption used, public
opinion was not a potent factor in the government.
V/alpole was not completely successful in establishing
Cabinet unity, but did establish the precedent of ousting rebel
Ministers. These Cabinet outcasts, however, eventually over-
threw iValpole in the House of Commons, rhere was dissension
in the V7alpole Cabinet by 1739, and this dissension was a fac-
tor in his resignation in 1742. As we have said, V/alpole 'a
effect on the Cabinet system in general, was profound. The
"Inner Cabinet" was a feature of his method of government.
Cabinet Government, as we know it today, was \Tell established
by 1742.
T7ith the advent of Carteret, there were few changes
made in the Cabinet. Pelham's Cabinet was also a coalition.
He did not possess a great amount of authority over his col-
leagues, and there was much dissension throughout his admini-
stration.
Newcastle chose to conciliate rather than rule his
Ministers, and even allowed them to vote against government
proposals.
During the Chatham Administration, the ^^renvilles
were taken in to avoid their opposition. Chatham maintained
his superiority in the Cabinet, however, until 1760, when dis-
sension occurred. At that time it is fairly certain that a
united Cabinet could have thwarted the ambitious George III.
There was much dissension under Bute, and this was

partly the cause of his resignation.
Due to Gir cumstance s , Grenville had no rival as Prime
liinister. I|;e dissension in the Rockingham Cabinet was due,
in a large measure, to the company of "King's Friends".
By 1760, the Cabinet system was still further along
the road to maturity than it had been in 1742. It is interest-
ing to note that peers predominated the personnel of the Cabi-
nets of the first half of the eighteenth century.
From 1770 to 1783 we are concerned especially with
the activities of George ill. By 1770, because of the "King's
Friends", he was very powerful, and was actually the head of
his own party. His intentions were of the best, and he felt
he was backed up by the laws of the nation. In theory, he was
correct; in practice, he was wrong.
Lord i-iorth was powerful, as Prime kinister, in the
House of Commons, chiefly because of the power of the King.
Between 1778 and 1782, ^eorge III was siaply obstinate in his
retention of power; he would not permit Jorth to resign. Even-
tually, liotth did resign, ne left the office considerably
weakened in prestige because of his character, ihere were
several reasons why ueorge Ill's plan of government failed:
one of the most immediate was the failure to suppress the Ameri-
can Revolution.
I
In 1782, the King was forced to acceDt an objection-
able Prime Minister in the person of Rockingham, together with
an equally objectionable Cabinet. Rockingham died in 1782
i
and ShellDurae, through the King's power, came into office. He
proved to be a mere puppet to the King.
George III was forced to accept the ?ox-Worth Coali-
tion in 1783, although it had been formed with the express pur-
pose of weakening the Grown. George III naturally enough, op-
posed the coalition, and eventually overthrew it.
Worth was Prime Minister in name only. Few changes
in the Cabinet were necessary when he came into office. He
was supreme in this Cabinet due to the support of the King.
Nevertheless dissension arose in the Cabinet in 1780.
A significant aspect of the Rockingham administration
was that the whole Cabinet changed with a change in the office
of Prime Minister; this was the first time this had occurred.
There was discord in both the Shelburae and the
Fox-IIorth Cabinets, and this accounts for their short duration.
From 1783 to 1803 the office of Prime Minister was
restored to its former position of authority in the British
government. The forceful personality of V/illiam Pitt ^ the
Younger ,was an important factor in this re-establishment.
Pitt came into office on the strength of George Ill's power,
but soon it was clear that he was more powerful than the King,
After 3 long administration, he resigned because of the Catho-
lic question in Ireland, V/e find, however, even so late as
1804, that the King was still influential in selecting the
Cabinet
.
Pitt's relation to the House of Commons is interest-

ing. He came into of i ice without a majority, and did not have a
real following in the Lower House until after the General Elec-
tion of 1784. Pitt, like V/alpole, was inclined to sacrifice
principles for power. He was not entirely sure of a majority,
even from 1786 to 1788. All these factors indicate that mini-
sterial responsibility to Parliament was not yet firmly esta-
blished. Pitt did not rule by party alone, but he was instru-
mental in bringing out the two party system. By 1794, as Prime
Minister, he was recognized as the leader of the Tories. Al-
though he ruled over a Coalition Cabinet, Pitt was an absolute
Prime Minister; he was similar to V/alpole in this respect.
Although his administration did not accomplish much in construc-
Itive measures, Pitt firmly established the office of Prime
Minister. Pitt's own conception of the office was well formu-
lated in 1803.
Today, the general conception of the Cabinet and the
Prime Minister is much the same as it was in 1803; the powers
of both are merely amplified. The Prime Minister is a dictator
so long as he controls a majority in the House of Commons. The
subservience of the Prime Minister to the King is a purely
nominal affair. Although the whole system is based on custom,
not law, it is nevertheless secure.

Prime Ministers between 1721 and 1801
Sir Robert Walpole - 1721 - 1742
Lord John Carteret - 1742 - 1744
Henry Pelhain-1744 - 1754
Duke of Newcastle - 1754 - 1756
Duke of Devonshire and William Pitt - 1756 - 1757
William Pitt and the Duke of Newcastle - 1757 - 1762
Earl of Bute - 1762 - 1763
George Grenville - 1763 - 1765
Marquis of Rockingham - 1765 - 1766
Wra, Pitt, the Earl of Chatham - 1766 - 1767
Duke of Grafton - 1767 - 1770
Lord North - 1770 - 1782
Marquis of Rockingham - 1782
Earl of Shelburne - 1782 - 1783
Duke of Portland, Lord North and Charles Fox,
Coalition - 1783
William Pitt, the Younger - 1783 - 1801.
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